

THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

THE Student Christian Movement Press has issued (in paper covers ; 2s. 6d. net) a short introduction to the history of Christian doctrine under the title *Creeds in the Making*. The author, the Rev. Alan RICHARDSON, formerly Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford, writes in an attractive popular style, and shows himself to be in sympathy with modern ways of thought. After reviewing the early development of doctrine, he dwells in particular upon the formulations of the Trinity, the Person of Christ, the Atonement, and the Holy Spirit. It is appropriate that this month we should consider the treatment of the last-named doctrine, which is a doctrine that puzzles many people to-day.

The raw material, as it were, of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the early Christian belief in God as ever-present and ever-active in the world. It was a belief inherited from Judaism. But whereas the Jews had tended to limit the divine activity to the fortunes of the Chosen Race, the early Christians conceived of it as extending over the whole range of human life. They themselves felt the presence and power of God to be with them in all their efforts to spread the gospel ; and their experience of God was always for them a living fellowship with the Master whom they had followed in Galilee.

‘ God was now seen to possess the character and quality of Jesus. The great Spirit of the world, hitherto ignorantly worshipped by genuinely reli-

gious pagans as Logos, or the pervading Reason of God, now received a name ; the immanent Spirit recognized by Greek philosophers and men of religion was discovered to be the Spirit of Jesus—as he had been known in Galilee—on a cosmic scale. The Unknown God was now felt to possess a character, the character of the love that was in Jesus Christ. The early Christians found that the Spirit of their Master so completely filled the world that they at once came to identify the immanent Spirit of God in the universe with the now universalised Spirit of their Risen Lord.’ And thus it happens that in the New Testament the phrases ‘ Spirit of God ’ and ‘ Spirit of Jesus ’ are used more or less interchangeably.

The subsequent doctrine of the Holy Spirit as developed by the Church after the close of the Apostolic period was loyal to the teaching of the New Testament. Indeed, it was laid down in defence of the New Testament faith against heretical tendencies, and not from a merely theoretical interest. It was against the Macedonian heresy that in the so-called Nicene Creed, endorsed by the Council of Constantinople in A.D. 381, the Holy Spirit is affirmed to be Divine : ‘ the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, . . . who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified.’ In the Chalcedonian Definition of A.D. 451, and in the so-called Athanasian Creed of about the same date, the Divinity or Godhead of the Holy Spirit is even more explicitly affirmed.

According to the Christian conception, then, the Holy Spirit is no mere impersonal agency at work in the nature of things, no vague, abstract, blindly moving Force. It is God Himself in action. It is the active, living God to whom both the Old and the New Testament bear witness—a God who neither slumbers nor sleeps. Through the Holy Spirit we may enter into personal relationship with God, who possesses a character as clearly defined as that of Jesus Christ.

‘The Church to-day sorely needs to reawaken to the full realisation of the significance of her ancient doctrine of God as Holy Spirit. Only by so doing will she be able to overcome the devitalising and ancient superstition that God is remote and uninterested in the affairs of men—a position to which we all too easily revert when we lose touch with the Christian experience of the Holy Spirit. She must renew in this present age her fellowship with the active, living God, whose leadership and creative work in the world to-day are no less real and powerful than in the pioneer days of Paul’s first Gentile mission.’

Mr. RICHARDSON ends on a note with which many Churchmen will find themselves in full accord: ‘The Christian Church is, or should be, the true home of God’s Spirit on the earth, or, to vary the metaphor, the supreme instrument of his activity in the world. The Spirit assuredly uses other instruments—the League of Nations, a Disarmament Conference, or a Slum Clearance Committee, perhaps—but ideally, at any rate, the Church is his instrument *par excellence*. That is her sole *raison d’être*. For the Church is still the living body of Christ on earth, his incarnation in the twentieth century, and through the Church the Spirit moves towards the sanctification of the world.’

A distinguished leader of thought, being consulted on a vital point in ethics, gave the discouraging reply, ‘We are all groping; you must just grope with the rest.’

It is not a reply that would naturally have

occurred to men’s minds in former times. For it was felt then that while much might be uncertain there was much that was sure. There was a divinely appointed path to walk in; there were great and immovable landmarks, set from the beginning for man’s guidance throughout his earthly pilgrimage. To these if a man would but give good heed there was no fear of his going astray.

But now for a great mass of the people of to-day that feeling of certainty is gone. A fog seems to have fallen over the face of man’s intellectual and moral world, obliterating the ancient landmarks and leaving the wayfarer honestly bewildered. Through the fog he hears many voices calling, but how is he to know which of them he ought to follow?

The causes of this lamentable uncertainty have been variously assigned. The doctrine of relativity is held to be largely responsible. Einstein has emphasized and succeeded in impressing on the public mind the fact that all our viewpoints are relative, that no two viewpoints are the same, and that things cannot really be what they appear to us to be. Einstein’s whole endeavour, doubtless, was to find a way of overcoming this relativity, and in this he attained a marvellous success, but the critical part of his work is what has mainly been laid hold of. It has spread abroad the idea that my point of view is as good as my neighbour’s, that my thoughts are as likely to be true as his, that all absolute standards are swept away, and that we are perfectly free to follow any path we choose.

That this is a most unhappy state of mind and a very grave danger to the moral order every serious person must deeply feel. The lamentable uncertainty of to-day is in striking contrast to the note of certainty which resounds through the Scriptures. Here we encounter men who speak with assurance. They do not hesitate to say, ‘We know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is true’; then, as if to make assurance doubly sure, they add, ‘We know that we know Him.’

Is there any way whereby we may attain this certainty? Is it possible still to hear a voice which

says, 'This is the way, walk ye in it,' and so to find rest to our souls? In the American Christian Quarterly, *Religion in Life*, there is a thoughtful article on the subject of 'Certainty,' by the Rev. Edgar P. DICKIE, B.D., in which he deals in particular with the answers to man's search for assurance which have been given by the Barthian School and by Karl Heim of Tübingen.

Touching briefly on the various realms of intellectual activity, he finds that certainty is not attainable in æsthetics where judgments are influenced by individual taste, nor in metaphysics where the answers to the question 'what is truth?' are as varied as the schools of the philosophers. The same uncertainty has invaded the field of ethics. 'Oswald Spengler carries the investigations of Einstein to a more alarming conclusion, when he applies the same methods to ethics. In ethical matters, he claims to have brought about a revolution comparable to that of Copernicus in astronomy; to have removed the centre-point of ethical orientation. The sense of "duty," which has hitherto been regarded as absolute, and universal in all men, is, he would say, quite as naïve a piece of self-deception as any to which the geocentric astronomers were prone. To-day men are prepared to die for that which they consider right. But rightness can be determined only by an omniscient spectator of all time and all experience. Not being that, we have no guarantee that our view of the ethical obligation is anything more than a parochial prejudice. The man of the future may feel it his duty to die for the very opposite of that for which men to-day are ready to die.'

Is there any way out of the fog, any sure pathway to truth, any bridge leading over into the country of reality? This is a matter of life and death, as both the Barthians and Karl Heim insist. That is what they mean by their emphasis on 'existential thinking.' The attitude of the mere observer is an impossible one. Nobody can really stand outside life and look upon it as a spectacle. If any one attempts to take up that attitude he shuts himself off from truth. 'Metaphysics, unable to shake free from Aristotle's "world spectatorship" or *bios*

theoretikos, gives an æsthetic view of God, without passion or personal decision. But religion represents the search for truth, with the whole soul and the whole of existence at stake.'

Barth acknowledges, indeed is vividly conscious of, the relativity of history. But he counters this with the great affirmation that there is given to man a sure Word of God. At this point he is brought into touch with the divine, or rather the divine breaks in upon him abruptly. God is transcendent, and is not to be found by any human effort or search, 'an unbridgeable gulf separates man from God.' It cannot be crossed from man's side, and every attempt to do so is but a repetition of the proud assault of the Titans. But in the mercy of God there breaks in upon man in his utter helplessness that divine and saving Word of God which is given in Christ. Here man reaches certainty in the possession of the eternally real.

Points of criticism will at once occur. If God is so remote and separate from man it becomes hard to see in what way He can come to be known. Surely something may be known of Him through His works of creation and providence. On the other hand, if the finite is so incapable of the infinite, how can the Word of God ever find a point of attachment in the human soul? 'If there is one certainty in human life it is that God is speaking in conscience. A conscience stabbed awake is God's voice; is man in touch with very God. And, because this is the Father of Jesus, the last word of the stricken conscience is *not* man's "Depart from me," but God's "Come unto Me." There are both words in the voice of conscience, and each is an essential part of the experience.' Further, it may be asked, by what criterion is the Word of God to be recognized? To this Barth would no doubt reply that the Word of God is self-authenticating, or comes home convincingly by the testimony of the Holy Spirit within the heart. It is obvious that the ultimate ground of certainty cannot be authenticated by anything beyond itself, for then that other thing would become the ultimate ground.

Karl Heim, like Barth, is much concerned with

the question of certainty. He realizes that it must have its home in the beyond, it must come to us as a Power which commands. He finds it at the meeting-place of Christ and the soul. 'Deliberately and confidently, Heim places Christ at the centre of metaphysics.' He is the ultimately real, the One who has appeared in time but passes not away, the Master of the world's fate. Spengler argues that our position at one given point in space and time is mere chance, with no absolute value in the universe. Karl Heim replies that face to face with Christ the soul finds its eternal destiny and value.

This certainty has its root in a personal relationship, not in any scientific process or intellectual activity. 'As the best human analogy for that unassailable certainty between the believer and Christ, Heim takes the relationship of trust between husband and wife. It is of the same quality—"I am my Beloved's, and my Beloved is mine." It is a relation which is in possession of absolute certainty, because it is a relation of trust. God trusts me beyond that which I now am : I trust him beyond that which I now see.'

And so, 'the appeal in preaching, whether it be to reason, to imagination, or to the ethical will, is null and void if it does not first lead toward a closer communion with Christ. Revelation being personal and incommunicable, it is possible for the preacher to come between the convert and God. There may be times when he is best left alone—with God. The word "Certainty" perhaps best expresses this conclusion, for the word has two sides. It is, first, convincing truth, and, second, personal conviction. Only from truth that is certain can we produce certainty about the truth. We preach for a verdict, urgently, as dying unto dying men. And we are able so to preach only because we can say, "It pleased God to reveal his Son in me."'

One of the criticisms made against Christianity to-day is that Jesus is no longer relevant to human need. He lived, we are told, in a simple society,

largely rural and pastoral, and the issues which confronted Him in His day have no kinship with those that face us in a civilization world-wide, urbanized and mechanized, and shaped by the exigencies of an imperious commercialism. A striking answer to this criticism is made by the Rev. Richard ROBERTS, D.D., in his remarkable book, *That Strange Man upon His Cross* (Allenson ; 3s. 6d. net).

The view referred to can be maintained, he says, only by those who have not acquainted themselves with the pertinent facts. It is too easily assumed that Palestine was a land of small, unimportant happenings. But there were elements in the situation in Palestine which are staggering in their modernity no less than in their tragedy. If it were conceivable that Jesus should reappear in the world and find Himself not in Palestine but in Germany to-day, He would discover Himself in a situation not unfamiliar to Him. In His day in Palestine the prevailing temper among His people was that of a heady and violent nationalism. The country was seething with sedition, and the empire employed tactics of ruthlessness against the insurgents. In the case of the Galilean Judas, the Romans with their terrible and pitiless efficiency made short work of the rebels and crucified two thousand of them.

That was the kind of setting in which the life of Jesus was lived. He spent His days among fierce nationalists and under the shadow of a sharp and merciless sword. In Germany to-day the rôles are differently cast, but the situation is essentially the same. There, at the moment, nationalism is victorious and rampant ; and the rebels are the Communists who are having as short shrift from the Nazis as the Palestinian nationalists did from the Romans. What we have in Germany is merely a fresh deal of the same tragic old pack of cards.

Not so very long ago there was an even more remarkable parallel. A small nation was being unwillingly held within the Empire. In the north there was a loyalist minority, which desired to remain within the Empire. In the other parts

there was a nationalist revolutionary party which was aiming at the forcible ejection of the imperial power. That is a fair description of the situation in Ireland ten years ago; it is also an accurate description of the position in Palestine nineteen centuries ago. In the north Herod and his following were friendly to Rome. The Zealots were the Sinn Feiners of Palestine.

Nor is this the only 'Modernism' in the Gospels. Unemployment was not an unknown condition in Palestine. Jesus makes one such occasion the matter of a parable in which He sets forth the peculiar nature and operation of the divine justice, implying that our justice should be like it. Extortionate moneylending was apparently common; and if nowadays we tend to complain of customs, imposts, and tariffs, it was probably worse in Palestine, for there they had export duties and import duties, octroi, bridge and harbour duties, market taxes, a tax upon salt. The evils we call 'graft' and 'racketeering' and 'blackmail' were probably as common as they are to-day.

Moreover, around Herod and his party gathered all the moral corruption that is prone to flourish in a 'smart society'; and the conjugal affairs of that dissolute princeling made a toothsome morsel in the social gossip of the Empire. Much more could be adduced on these heads. What is sufficiently clear, however, is that the essentials of the human situation in Palestine were much the same as they are in ours. There is a difference, but it is a difference of scale and not of substance. Palestine was a small country; but it was, after all, on one of the great highways of the world; and pretty well the whole known world of that time came and

went through it. There was a sort of cosmopolitanism in Palestine; and it is misleading to regard it as a backwater.

It is true that science and technical skill have bridged the seas and made highways in the air, so that the whole world is shrunk into a neighbourhood, and the ends of the earth are at the ends of the street. Human life is organized on a much larger scale, but at bottom it is the same life as then. Raw human nature is much the same in New York as it was long ago in Jerusalem; and it is that that sets us our problems still. Modern external conditions inevitably affect the form and the scale of the problems; but they do not alter their inward substance. Jesus is not out of date, because it was with human nature He had to do; and so He still speaks directly to our condition.

How much like the human situation Jesus had to face is to ours becomes plain when we consider what we may call loosely its psychological aspect. When to-day we want to 'put something across' either commercially or politically we attack the public in one or other of three ways—bribery, sensationalism, or coercion. Instances of the first two may easily be found in trade and entertainment circles. The obvious examples of the third are Communism, Fascism, and Hitlerism. But, says Dr. ROBERTS, these were exactly the three expedients presented to Jesus in the Wilderness temptation for the furtherance of His ends. And this great experience of Jesus, in which He rejected each and all, makes it clear that the years have introduced no great novelty into the psychology of the human situation in this world. We need not worry ourselves about the relevancy of Jesus to our condition.

Things most certainly Believed.

IX.

BY HERBERT G. WOOD, SELLY OAK, BIRMINGHAM.

'I BELIEVE in one God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth—maker of all things visible and invisible.' This is the fundamental faith, which brings a cosmos out of chaos, which harmonizes our highest interests and ensures that reverence deepens as knowledge grows. In this affirmation scientific inquiry and religious insight both find their account. The physical universe and the realm of the spirit have the same author and witness to the same God. The power that created us is the power that inspires and redeems us. The stars in their courses and the genius of a Newton or an Einstein owe their existence to the same Will. The God who made and sustains the world is the God and Father of the Lord Jesus. The power, wisdom, and love which we discern in that order in the external world have their counterpart and completion in the love, wisdom, and power which we discern in reverse order in the fact of Christ. The supreme importance of this faith and its full meaning can never be grasped on its first acceptance. Conviction is borne in upon us as we discover the outworkings in human experience both of the affirmation and of the denial of the first article of the Christian creed.

In retrospect the conflict with Gnosticism must appear as a life-and-death struggle, in which the interests not only of religion but also of science were involved. The spiritual science of a Valentinus, amazing in its intricacy and its speculative ingenuity, would have proved a barrier to scientific inquiry, could it have fastened its hold on the imagination and intelligence of the Roman world. His system was a splendid edifice of fantasy-thinking, in which men were invited to take refuge from the realities of everyday life. Even the more sober and more attractive teaching of Marcion made a fatal division between the Supreme Deity and the Demiurge who created our sublunary universe. Marcion fastened, indeed, with real insight on what was new and unexpected in the coming of Jesus. Few titles that have been applied to Jesus come closer to *le mot juste* than his phrase, 'The Stranger.' Yet it was to His own that Jesus came, to His own world and to His own people, and men made strange missed the splendour of His advent. The divorce of the Old Testament

from the New, essential to Marcion's doctrine and beloved of many moderns, would have proved fatal in the long-run to truth both in religion and in historical inquiry. Origen rightly castigated the noble Gnostic's contrast of justice with mercy as destructive of fundamental morality. Docetism—the doctrine that Christ became man in appearance only and not in reality—was part and parcel of the same mistaken separation. Flesh is here disjoined from spirit, just as the Old Testament is parted from the New, Creation from Redemption, and justice from mercy. By a sure instinct the Church refused to tear asunder what God had joined. A phantom-Christ could never become the bearer or the content of a real gospel.

These old Gnostic schools belong to the past, yet the modern world teems with similar alternatives to the fundamental Christian faith, and we cannot but ask whether present-day Gnostics make out any better case than their predecessors. For myself, I become the more deeply convinced of the truth of the opening affirmation of the Apostle's Creed, the more closely I study the speculations of those who reject it. The implications of this clause for the Christian in the modern world are far-reaching and important. When we say 'we believe in God, maker of heaven and earth,' we affirm the existence alike of the external world and of the mental and spiritual world. We assert that these worlds are distinct, though interdependent. We assert that neither can be explained fully in terms of the other, that is, that psychology and ethics can never be reduced to physics, and that physics can never be replaced by psychology and ethics. We assert, likewise, that the worlds of Nature and of value are not self-caused, self-sustained, and self-explanatory. Both depend on the will of God, who is above and beyond both. We assert further that we do not create either world. The external world exists independently of us, and we do not imagine and determine the good, the true, and the beautiful. There are objective standards, God-given not man-created, to which we learn to respond. This faith I believe to be essential not only to our moral but to our intellectual salvation. The real alternative to it is a thoroughgoing scepticism not only in religion but also in science. Such scepticism

I believe to be morbid and irrational, but inevitable in the long-run, if Christian theism be rejected. There are, however, many half-way houses on the road to the sceptic's Gehenna.

Clearly, if we are reluctant to affirm our faith in God as the maker of heaven and earth, there are various alternatives which at first sight look possible and attractive. Thus we may believe God to be the maker of heaven but not of earth, the author of the spiritual but not of the material. The external world is then the projection not indeed of some inferior spirit like the Demiurge of Gnostic speculation, but of ourselves and of ourselves, not at our best but at our worst. The material is an illusion created by our mortal mind, by our spirits in so far as they are merely human and not divine. There seems little justification for such a view, and indeed it is more difficult to justify than the earlier Gnostic teaching, but the necessary consequences of it seem to be to deny the reality and value of the knowledge obtained in the sciences of Nature and to rob us of our delight in the external world. The situation can indeed be saved by returning to the idealism of Berkeley, which claims that the external world is spiritual in its intrinsic character. But for Berkeley, God is the maker and sustainer of the external world, whatever be its intrinsic character. If we follow Berkeley, we can save our faith in science, for the physical world exists independently of us, and must be observed and investigated by the methods of natural science. We could still say, that the external world, essentially spiritual, is misunderstood by mortal mind as something material. But the doctrine is open to grave suspicion, as it seems to be intended to permit us to pick and choose arbitrarily in our experience of the external world, to regard the pleasurable as real and spiritual, and to treat the painful as illusory and material. This is to alter quite capriciously the conditions on which our spiritual inner life is linked with the external physical universe. The view that matter and pain are illusions is not a legitimate deduction from Berkeley's idealism. If an essentially spiritual world appears to us as material, that means simply that it exists independently of our desires. It is what it is, and we cannot honestly say what we like in it is real, what we dislike is illusion. In thus criticising what I understand to be the position of Christian Science, I am not ignoring the fact that it has brought home the truth of God's love to many so convincingly as to minister to health of body and mind. Yet I am persuaded that this form of Gnosticism, like the old, fundamentally

misconceives the material and the spiritual, and the relation of the two. Its view of pain as bound up with the physical and as essentially evil is itself an error. Pain is not always or necessarily evil, and the worst and most evil pains and agonies are primarily spiritual and not physical or material. When thought through, Christian Science involves a denial alike of the Incarnation and the Atonement. The doctrines of Mrs. Eddy are very similar to those of Cerinthus, and are open to the same objections. We do not advance in knowledge of the spiritual by contempt for the physical, or in knowledge of the supernatural by despising the natural. A sentence of Wilfrid Monod seems to me to express the Christian position. 'Plus on a d'âme, et plus on respecte la matière' (*Silence et Prière*, 71).

Other ways of evading or emasculating the first thing most surely believed among Christians are to treat either the spiritual or the physical as fundamental, as self-sustained and self-caused, and to regard the other as the epiphenomenon, the dependent accompaniment of the one which is held to be fundamental. Spiritual monism or some form of materialism are the alternatives then open to us. Curiously enough, though directly opposed to one another, exponents of these alternative philosophies unite with one another in espousing the theory of the Christ-myth and in denying the historicity of Jesus. Arthur Drews and W. B. Smith, both spiritual monists, and my friend Gilbert Sadler, who believes that the truth of Christianity really was the possession of the early Gnostics and that the Apostles' Creed is an unfortunate aberration from spiritual insight, join hands with J. M. Robertson and M. Couchoud, to dissolve the Gospel-history into myth. But all the writers of the Christ-myth school, without exception, ignore the canons of scientific historical inquiry, and deny the most assured results of such inquiry. Just as Christian Science involves an unwarranted scepticism in the field of natural science, so spiritual monism and rationalist materialism involve an equally unwarranted scepticism in the field of historical research. The denial of the Christian faith is here once again the degradation of science. A single illustration may serve to enforce my contention. The issue of *The Freethinker* for February 17 contains an interesting article on 'J. M. Robertson's Christianity and Mythology,' by Mr. H. Cutner. Mr. Cutner opines that 'the mythological solution of the problems of both Jesus and the New Testament put forward by John M. Robertson will eventually prevail. It rests on the

solid foundations of scholarship and truth.' Mr. Cutner's capacity for estimating the solidity of the foundations of scholarship on which the mythological solution rests, may be judged by his handling of F. C. Conybeare, to whose trenchant criticism in *The Historical Christ* J. M. Robertson was never able to furnish any real answer. This is the way in which Mr. Cutner handles F. C. Conybeare. 'He commences—without any argument about it—with the Gospel of Mark, which he declares to be the earliest narrative document in the New Testament. This is "evident" when compared with the three other evangelists. . . . Moreover, Conybeare constantly refers to "an old document" called Q (Quelle) which, he says, was used by Luke and Matthew. He forgets to let his readers into the secret that there is no "Q" document in existence, and that Christian theologians have had to "infer" it to back up their case for the authenticity of the four "Canonical" gospels.' It is quite evident from this paragraph that Mr. Cutner is only imperfectly acquainted with the history and present position of the literary criticism of the Gospels. Whether the foundations of scholarship on which the myth-theory rests be solid or not, Mr. Cutner is incapable of pronouncing any judgment on the point. His certificate is worthless, but he is a pious disciple of J. M. Robertson, for J. M. Robertson also was antiquated and unscientific in his handling of the New Testament documents. I have spent a good deal of time on the literature of the Christ-myth since I became interested in it when Arthur Drews reopened the question, and the more I have read the more convinced a Christian do I become. The idea that we make Christ more spiritual by regarding Him as a mythical, fictitious personality seems a strange delusion at the best. But if we are honest in handling historical evidence, we must admit that Christ was an actual historic figure. If spiritual monism requires a mythical Christ, so much the worse for spiritual monism. It must be false, as it is in conflict with historical science. Rationalist materialism is in like case. It essayed to discover illusion, fantasy, at the heart of Christianity. Its contention is denied not by interested theologians but by sober historical scholarship. The whole rationalist materialist position is discredited, at least for me, by its endeavour and its failure to establish a mythical solution of Jesus and the New Testament.

The writer whose attempts to evade the Christian conclusion most fascinate me and most convince me of the strength of the Christian position is Mr. Bertrand Russell. It is indeed disheartening that

one of the most brilliant minds of our generation should contribute so little that is positive and constructive to the fundamental thought of the post-war world. Happily there is much that is suggestive in detail in his writings, flashes of genius that may be treasured, even if he provides no metaphysical justification for whatever is of value in his own work. For his philosophy issues in a barren and indefensible scepticism. It is difficult to analyse his creed, for it is so constantly under revision, but he appears to vacillate between Solipsism and materialism, and whenever he realizes with a start the absurdity of both extremes, he balances himself uneasily midway between the two, and declares himself a believer in neutral monism. Here is one statement of his creed. 'In metaphysics my creed is short and simple. I think that the external world may be an illusion, but if it exists it consists of events, short, small, and haphazard. Order, unity, and continuity are human inventions, just as truly as are catalogues and encyclopædias. But human inventions can within limits be made to prevail within our human world.'¹ This last phrase appears to mean 'within the external world so far as it impinges on us men and is subject to our control.' Here we have Mr. Russell inclined to Solipsism—a philosophic creed which I should regard as less respectable than Christian Science—and if he wavers from Solipsism, he will be to all intents and purposes a materialist, but with no faith in the laws and causal order discovered by the sciences. In scientific research men are not discovering any truths about the external world but only imposing on a little bit of its regularities which make it easier for men to handle for their own purposes. Science is no longer the pursuit of truth; it is the pursuit of power. Mr. Russell imagines that 'science as the pursuit of truth is being killed by a scepticism which the skill of the men of science has generated.' He is mistaken. The root of scepticism is decay of faith in one God who made heaven and earth. When men held this faith, they believed themselves to be in a real intelligible universe, and they expected to discover a rational order in it. This faith is the mainspring of science as the pursuit of truth. When men forgot this faith and imagined that science could dispense with it, they inevitably became sceptical about science itself. Mr. Russell's creed does not become more impressive by force of repetition. On an earlier page of *The Scientific Outlook*, we read: 'Academic philosophers ever since the time of Parmenides have believed that the world is a unity.

¹ *The Scientific Outlook*, 101.

... The most fundamental of my intellectual beliefs is that this is rubbish. I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence and orderliness or any of the other properties that governesses love. Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to be said for the view that there is a world at all.' A later page presents us with the same dismal outlook. 'As physics has developed, it has deprived us step by step of what we thought we knew concerning the intimate nature of the physical world. Colour and sound, light and shade, form and texture, belong no longer to that external nature that the Ionians sought as the bride of their devotion. All these things have been transferred from the beloved to the lover, and the beloved has become a skeleton of rattling bones, cold and dreadful, but perhaps a mere phantasm' (p. 272).

It is difficult to discuss such an amazing confession of faith. Three times over Mr. Russell tells us he is either a Solipsist or a materialist, but he cannot make up his mind which. Three times over he assures us that if the external world exists, it must be disorderly, irrational, and unpleasant. It is impossible to argue with a man who does not know on which leg he is standing, but it is possible to prophesy that on whichever leg he elects to stand, he will be in unstable equilibrium. Mr. Russell obviously veers towards Solipsism because modern physics strips from us all that the old-fashioned materialist thought we knew about the physical world. There is really no need for such panic. Mr. Russell need not give up his belief in an external world. All he has to surrender is the absurd assumption that physics and only physics tells us anything about that world. When he says that colour and sound, light and shade, form and texture have been transferred to the beloved, the statement would be more convincing if one knew who had effected the transfer and on what terms. Because all these qualities are relative to us as observers, it does not follow that they belong to us and not to the external world. This is the fallacy of old-fashioned idealism. As to the physicists' world of electrons and protons and what not, being 'a skeleton of rattling bones, cold and dreadful,' that is empty rhetoric, an imaginative error, a glaring pathetic fallacy such as formed the basis of the Free Man's Worship. Personally, I find the world of the atom anything but cold and dreadful. I find it fascinating and exhilarating, but then I am not so silly as to suppose that what the physicists tell me about the atom is the fundamental truth about the universe.

At first sight, Mr. Russell's view that if the

external world exists it consists of events, short, small, and haphazard, seems to have some support in modern physics, since the movements of individual atoms appear to be incalculable, and physical laws, in many instances, are simply laws of averages. This is the only possible scientific support for Mr. Russell's view, and he is precluded from appealing to it as he has rebuked Eddington for basing any argument on the principle of indeterminacy. It is not open to Mr. Russell to repudiate indeterminacy in criticising Eddington, and then to say that a faith in indeterminacy is the most fundamental of his intellectual beliefs. While the external world is no phantasm, Mr. Russell's view of it may be fairly regarded as the projection of himself. He thinks the external world consists of spots and jumps without coherence, because his own inner world is incoherent and confused. And the source of the vacillations and self-contradictions in which he is involved is not far to seek. The starting-point of the Free Man's Worship is the rejection of faith in the union of goodness and power in God. Rejecting that faith, Mr. Russell adopts one untenable position after another. Solipsist, materialist, neutral monist, he is each by turns, and nothing long. He is entangled in a barren scepticism which makes him entertaining as a critic and useless as a guide. He is quick to denounce other men's positive faiths as mere prejudice and habit. He does not observe that his own lugubrious negatives bear the same character. What he says of Eddington's optimism is true of his own pessimism. This outlook 'is based upon the time-honoured principle that anything which cannot be proved untrue may be assumed to be true, a principle whose falsehood is proved by the fortunes of bookmakers.' Perhaps I am too kind to Mr. Russell's creed in saying so much, for I believe both parts of it are demonstrably false. Mr. Russell's adherence to it is simply prejudice, however, and since he regards the aim of philosophy as being the examination and removal of prejudice, it is time he turned his powers of sceptical analysis upon his own crotchets and became a philosopher in earnest. He might, for example, ask himself this simple question: 'When in writing *The Scientific Outlook* I named a living scientist along with Galileo, Newton, and Darwin, why did I choose Pavlov rather than Freud or Einstein?' The answer to that question would throw a flood of light on his deep-seated but not, one may hope, ineradicable prejudices.

While I derive some confirmation of the faith by reviewing the limitations of possible alternatives, its true confirmation follows from the enrichment

of life and thought which results from its acceptance. In his *Journal* George Fox records how on one occasion in the vale of Belvoir, there came over him as a black cloud the thought 'all things come by Nature.' He says he sat still under it for about half an hour, when there arose in his mind the thought, 'there is a living God that made all things.' We moderns have been sitting under this black cloud long enough. Indeed, we have covered ourselves with it in order to escape God. Abraham Lincoln as a young man when he was reading in St. John's Gospel the verse, 'There was a man sent from God whose name was John,' drew a line through the word 'God' and wrote in the margin 'Nature.' This was not a happy variant reading, but it is typical of our modern humanism. We have set Nature as a screen between ourselves and God, and in excluding God we have lost joy. We must recover old Sir Thomas Browne's conviction that 'Nature is God's art.' We must recover, likewise, the Psalmist's conviction that it is God who has made us and not we who have made ourselves, and if there is 'a mystic harmony linking sense to sound and sight,' then God is the author of it. The delightful secrets of colour and sound, light and shade, form and texture belong neither to Nature nor to man, neither to the beloved nor to the lover, but to the God who made both Nature and man for Himself.

The interest of modern physics for the Christian lies in its revelation of the external world as the scene of God's constant activity. Indeed, we might fairly regard this picture of atomic energy as a commentary on the text, 'My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.' And the world of the atom revealed by the physicist is basic only in the sense of being the instrumental groundwork on which the universe is built up. It is not basic in the sense of being the ultimate and enduring reality. Sir Arthur Eddington, indeed, speaks somewhere

of the table as the physicist conceives it, as if it were the real table in contrast with the table of ordinary discourse. But the concourse of whirling atoms, consisting mostly of space, which the physicist discerns in the table is not more real than the qualities which common sense discovers in the table. And the spiritual reality of the table is different from the vision of the physicist and the outlook of common sense though inclusive of both. I well remember hearing Studdert Kennedy say on one occasion, 'There is more of God in a loaf of bread than in corn in the ear, there is more of God in bottled plums than in plums on the tree.' He was thinking of the service and labour of our fellows embodied in the baked loaf and the bottled plums, and indeed the gift of God to us in the service of our fellows should be more precious to us than His gifts in Nature. But there is something more involved in Studdert Kennedy's assertion. As I see it, the spiritual reality of the table, the awesome mystery of it, lies in the fact that here the power, the energy of God is submissive to our human purposes. If we realized this truth, we might not find our human artefacts, our buildings and furnishings, such a barrier between ourselves and God, and we might not need to resort to Nature so frequently to recover the sense of His presence. For the meaning of our activities and our creations is that the God who made earth as well as heaven is indeed the servant of His servants. Alas! that He must so often serve with our sins. Yet to believe in God as creator as well as redeemer is to find our delight in Nature justified and deepened, our delight in creative activity sobered and ennobled. It means also a constant purge of our profanity and self-satisfaction and self-seeking. On the maintenance of this fundamental faith in one God, maker of heaven and earth, depend our hopes of scientific progress, of social reconstruction and of individual salvation.

Literature.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.

'The history of Israel is the record of the interaction of these two orders of society' (*i.e.* those of the nomad Aramæan and of the agricultural and commercial Amorite), 'or rather of the spiritual

principles which they embodied.' 'To appreciate the history of Hebrew religion, we must study the reactions on one another of the two types of social order and of belief.' These quotations from comparatively recent British works will serve to illustrate one aspect of the general attitude taken by

students of the Old Testament in post-war Europe. We therefore welcome an American treatment of Hebrew history along lines already familiar on this side of the Atlantic. *God and the Social Process* (Cambridge University Press; 9s. net) is not the first work of this kind published by Mr. Louis Wallis, but his 'Sociological Study of the Bible' (1912) seems to have attracted little attention among European scholars.

Mr. Wallis does well to remind us at the outset that the Hebrew did not divide life into watertight compartments—the term Baal, to him, involved a whole social order, in its economic as well as in its religious aspect. To the two conflicting principles he gives the name 'Baalism' and 'Mishpat.' The latter term is not very happily chosen; it is true that 'Mishpat' ('Justice') was an essential element in the whole complex of ideas to which Mr. Wallis applies the word, but the term itself is one of the most comprehensive in the Hebrew language, and is, therefore, quite unsuitable as a slogan. Baalism could claim its 'Mishpat,' though it would have been very different from that of primitive Yahwism.

With the conflict between these two basic concepts of society as his principal criterion, Mr. Wallis traces the whole history of Israel. His attitude is strongly rationalistic, and while he accepts in the main the opinions of nineteenth-century higher criticism (and, indeed, often lends them valuable support), he has no sympathy with the twentieth-century tendency to allow some historical value to racial and tribal tradition. He is nearer to Winckler than to Volz. In all other respects the outstanding characteristic of the work is its independence. This is at once Mr. Wallis's great strength and his great weakness. It is a real intellectual triumph for an isolated worker to have produced so thorough and effective a piece of work, and Mr. Wallis is isolated, for he seems to ignore entirely all European post-war work on the Old Testament. On the other hand, he often falls into more or less serious error from his neglect of his contemporaries. There seems to be no mention of modern archæological work, yet a knowledge, shall we say, of Garstang's excavations in Jericho would have solved one or two serious difficulties. In the work done at Samaria, too, he would have found valuable evidence as to social and economic conditions in the ninth century, and would have added real strength to his hypothesis. His account and explanation of the law of limited slavery would have been impossible to any student of the legal codes of Western Asia. His treatment both of the disruption and of Judah in general would have gained from a

recognition of the preferential treatment accorded to the South by Solomon, and by some consideration of Professor Alt's theory of the Kingdom. Sometimes we even suspect his Hebrew—'feminine baal of a baal' (p. 189) is not merely an awkward expression, it is an incorrect rendering of *beulath baal*, though it might be appropriate for *baalath baal*—if such a phrase were ever found.

In addition to these minor points, there is one very serious gap in Mr. Wallis's argument. He makes no attempt to explain why it was only in Israel that history took the course it did, and led in the end to the evolution of an ethical monotheism. By hypothesis (since Mr. Wallis excludes the supernatural), the Aramæan invaders, with their passion for 'Mishpat,' were typical nomads, while 'Baalism' was normal among the agricultural and commercial communities of Western Asia. The settlement of Israel in Canaan must have had many parallels in history; why was it that only here was this particular result attained? The Fundamentalist is, of course, ready with the reply of direct divine election and guidance, but Mr. Wallis cannot allow himself such a solution. The answer familiar in this country is that only here did the nomad who became a 'Baalist' still retain his sense of racial, political, and religious oneness with the nomad who remained on the older plane. Champions of 'Mishpat' in Israel might be constantly recruited from the non-agricultural East and South. It is strange that in his treatment of Elijah and Amos, in other respects so admirable, Mr. Wallis has missed this most significant feature of their place in the religion of Israel.

Against these and other points of weakness in this book we must set positive virtues. First among these are the clarity of presentation and singleness of purpose which seem to convince us even when we know that Mr. Wallis is wrong. *God and the Social Process* is a delightful book to read, and it puts the case far more clearly and explicitly than any other modern presentation. This in itself is no small thing, but there are one or two positive contributions of real importance. One of these is the stress laid on the Joseph tribes as the core of the genuine Israel, and on the story of their development (the account of Judah's origin is far less convincing). To some extent this was admitted by earlier writers, but nowhere else have we the theme so successfully worked out in detail. Another point, more important than it seems at first sight, is the contrast between 'ādōn and ba'al in the sense of 'master.' If further investigation supports Mr. Wallis's contention here,

we shall have had a valuable new criterion for higher criticism.

While, then, this book is very far from being (as the publishers claim on the 'jacket') a 'new adventure in the field of historical theology,' it is a most interesting study of one aspect of Old Testament history, and, when allowance is made for a number of weaknesses and errors due to the author's isolation, it will be found to have made a real contribution to our appreciation of the Bible.

FROM SARGON TO EZRA.

The retirement of Professor A. C. Welch, D.D., from the Chair of Hebrew and Old Testament Studies in New College, Edinburgh, removes one of our leading scholars from the ranks of active teachers. Yet Dr. Welch's mind is as keen as ever, his spirit as fresh, and his pen as ready; we may still hope for many years of original and challenging work from him.

His latest book, *Post-Exilic Judaism* (Blackwood; 7s. 6d. net), comprising the Baird Lecture for 1934, deals with the problems raised by the Books of Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, together with some reference to the post-exilic prophets, and is, therefore, a very welcome continuation of the work which Dr. Welch has already published on the later monarchical age. It is as stimulating and as striking as any of the author's earlier writings, and, whether it convinces us or not, it must compel us all to review our opinions on the history of fifth-century Israel.

We may mention in the first place one or two interesting critical views, on which the historical reconstruction in some measure depends. The unity of Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah is vigorously contested; one of the leading objections is that whereas the Chronicler accepts the Deuteronomistic identification of Priest and Levite, in Ezra the priesthood is limited as in the Priestly Code. Chronicles goes back practically to the age of Darius I. Still earlier is the tenth chapter of Nehemiah, which is the pact made by the Jews still surviving in Jerusalem after the catastrophe of 586 B.C. It continued to be the constitutional basis of Jewish society and worship till the time of Ezra. Further, the sources of the Books of Ezra and Nehemiah are discussed in a fresh and illuminating manner.

In the reconstruction of history, Dr. Welch deals at length with the alleged grounds for the Samaritan schism, with the history of the altar and of the

priesthood. His general conclusions on this last point resemble those which have been normally accepted—the recognition of the whole family of Aaron was a compromise between the theory of Deuteronomy and that of Ezekiel. We have, finally, a discussion of the actual work of Ezra, who is reduced to a comparatively small part in the drama of Jewish development.

As usually happens when we are presented with a novel set of theories, we feel that there are places where the reasoning is not really valid. Professor Welch does not claim infallibility, but all who know his work will agree that he has a flair for the detection of weak points in any 'regnant hypothesis.' There are one or two further questions that we should like to ask him—not that they would necessarily invalidate his theories. How, for instance, does he account for the complete gap in the archaeological series during the sixth century B.C.? It does seem as though civic life in southern Palestine ceased altogether after the Fall of Jerusalem. Other questions will constantly arise in the readers' minds. Dr. Welch's critical comments, however, will probably appeal to most of us as sound; whether his positive reconstruction is equally satisfactory can be determined only with the lapse of time.

BRADLEY AND BOSANQUET.

Students of the movement of Idealistic philosophy in Britain will be grateful to Professor J. H. Muirhead for editing the letters collected in the recent volume, *Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends* (Allen & Unwin; 12s. 6d. net). These letters illustrate the sources and the development of Bosanquet's philosophical opinions. They are mostly from Bosanquet's own pen, but many of them are letters written to Bosanquet; and among his friends and correspondents are such well-known writers as R. L. Nettleship, A. Pringle-Pattison, Clement Webb, S. Alexander, James Ward, R. F. A. Hoernlé, and F. H. Bradley. Indeed, the conception of this work arose from the question, once asked of Dr. Muirhead, whether it is possible to fix the time when Bosanquet definitely accepted Bradley's metaphysical doctrines.

Dr. Muirhead has arranged the correspondence under the engaging rubrics of Philosophy as Logic, The New Horizon, 'Then a Work on Metaphysics,' The War as Touchstone of Idealist Philosophy, The Younger Men, Italian Idealism at Close Quarters. He has supplied much useful and interesting matter in introduction to or supplement

of the individual letters, and a valuable index of Proper Names and Subjects.

Bosanquet's determination to devote his last years to putting himself in touch with the ideas of the younger men receives interesting illustration in this volume. The 'extremes' he had particularly in view, as we knew from his last complete work, were the contemporary neo-realism which had its chief home in America, and the contemporary neo-idealism which was represented chiefly by the school of Croce and Gentile in Italy. No letters have come to light from the neo-realist writers, but much of his correspondence with the neo-idealists has survived, and is here published, as putting the issue between his form of Idealism and theirs in a fuller and clearer way than do any of his books. His Italian correspondents were chiefly Signor Vivante, author of a work on the Principles of Ethics, and Professor Carlini, author of 'The Life of the Spirit,' a work which was generally recognized as summing up the teaching of Italian idealism.

BOOKS ON THE BIBLE.

Two notable books on the Bible have appeared, each in its own way different from the other, but both excellently fulfilling their aims. One is *The Story of the Bible Retold from Genesis to Revelation*, in the light of modern knowledge, by Mr. Walter Russell Bowie (R.T.S.; 12s. 6d. net). The writer has set himself to write the story that is contained in the Bible 'from the perspective of the best we know to-day about its various books and their relationships' without sacrificing the religious reverence which the Bible has always inspired. The author quotes freely from the text, now from the Authorized Version, sometimes from the Revised, and occasionally from Moffatt, but for the most part he tells the story in his own words, incorporating in his narrative unostentatiously the results of modern research. An admirable example of the sanity and skill with which he deals with his subject is furnished in the Introduction, in which he puts the newer (or at least the truer) view of the Bible quite clearly, but in such a way as to give little offence even to the most orthodox.

The difficult task which was entrusted to the author has, it seems to us, been admirably discharged. The book has been handsomely turned out, the print is clear and well-spaced, and the text is illustrated by many beautiful paintings by Mr. Harold Copping. It ought to be added that the language in which the author

writes is simple enough to be understood by children.

The other book is *A Golden Treasury of the Bible (and Apocrypha)*, selected and edited by Mr. Mortimer Rowe, B.A., with the assistance of the Rev. H. McLachlan, D.D., and Miss Dorothy Tarrant, M.A., Ph.D. (Lindsey Press; 7s. 6d. net). This volume contains an extensive selection of passages from the Bible and the Apocrypha, arranged in historical order, not in the traditional order. Amos, for example, is first among the prophets, then Hosea and 1 Isaiah; Obadiah is followed by 2 Isaiah (chs. 40-55), and Zechariah by 3 Isaiah (chs. 56-66). Joel is near the end, and Jonah is last. Job is divided clearly into cycles of debate. Proverbs is arranged under subjects. The First Book of the Maccabees is included, as well as 1 and 2 Esdras. In the Wisdom Literature we have almost all of Ecclesiasticus, a great deal of the Wisdom of Solomon, and a chapter of Tobit. Readings from the Synoptic Gospels are so arranged as to give a consecutive story of the life and teachings of Jesus. The Authorized Version is employed in most of the historical narrative of the Old Testament, but in the Prophets and Wisdom full use has been made of the results of modern scholarship. One of the most useful features of the book is the short introductory paragraphs of explanation before each book. These are very well done, and make the reading more interesting and intelligible. It only remains to say that the print is excellent and the book a pleasure to hold and to read.

One had almost forgotten about Krishnamurti, that pathetic figure, hailed in his youth by excited devotees as the new and long-expected prophet who was to make all the religions obsolete and out of date, by some as a reincarnation of the Lord Christ Himself, and whose booklets—interesting enough in their way—came as so huge and pitiful an anticlimax.

One knew, of course, that Conferences are held by the faithful, and that the teaching they receive is indeterminate and changeful. But when George Bernard Shaw, with his passion for drawing attention to himself at any cost, even by the rather obvious trick of saying the opposite of the obvious, announced that Krishnamurti 'is a religious teacher of the greatest distinction who is listened to with profit and assent by members of all churches and sects,' that seemed to foreshadow the end. Yet here we have *Krishnamurti and the World Crisis*

(Allen & Unwin ; 7s. 6d. net), wherein Lilly Heber, Ph.D., an enthusiastic disciple, in a superheated and unbalanced book, seems to assume we are all talking of little else than his beloved leader, and looking to him as the one hope in the difficulties of the day. Krishnamurti's main tenet is that all our tangled problems can be traced back to that insistent 'I.' In that, of course, there is nothing new. Masses of spiritual teachers have told us of the 'devil's pronouns, I, me, mine,' and of 'the master idol' of all idols. Nor is the tenet that that 'I' is really an illusion an original contribution—witness Buddha, for example, or if not Buddha himself as some assert, then the Buddhist theologians who drew up the Pali Canon.

That Krishnamurti lays his hand upon the real and central problem, who will deny? That he says things of moral value and importance is indisputable. But to any one acquainted with the philosophers of his own land, his is thin, superficial, platitudinous stuff; while those who know the great religious teachers will find themselves here in a barren land, where pretentiousness and an immense self-confidence cannot conceal the echoing vacancy.

Apparently some find help and sustenance in these dry pastures. Well, 'God fulfils himself in many ways.' And for spiritual beginners, sound-hearted and gallant, yet beginners, this may do—for a time. But that they should presume to think this is the final teaching, and the most and best within man's reach argues them blind indeed! Still, it takes all sorts to make a world. In music some like Beethoven, and some a tinkling jazz. In the deep matters of the soul some vote for Christ, and some for Krishnamurti.

David Hume has come to be regarded as the stock example of the complete sceptic. In popular presentations of his philosophy the mind is pictured as nothing more than a succession of impressions with no thread connecting them together. The refutation of this theory seems all too easy. In fact, it is self-annihilating. But its obvious incredibility may well suggest the question whether a thinker so acute as Hume, and a Scotsman at that, could have really been so simple-minded as he is made to appear, and whether he could not himself have seen the objections which are so patent to his critics. In *Hume's Theory of the Understanding* (Allen & Unwin ; 7s. 6d. net), Mr. Ralph W. Church, D.Phil., sets out to show that Hume is far from being the complete sceptic, but is definitely constructive in his epistemological theories. He subjects Hume's own words to a careful and detailed examination

and elucidates their meaning very admirably. The result is a solid piece of philosophical writing which should prove most helpful to the student who desires within reasonable compass a reliable guide to Hume's philosophy.

In a readable and suggestive little book entitled *The Best World Possible* (Allen & Unwin ; 4s. 6d. net), the Rev. A. Day, a minister in the Congregational Church, discusses the perennial problem of the existence and meaning of evil. He deals with the difficulties involved in life—growth, progress, character, and spirit; and, in a second part, with the difficult concepts of reality, revelation, validity, and hope. As the preface modestly warns us, it is a popular treatment, not a philosophical discussion. All the same, it will prove helpful to the class of reader that the author has in view.

Vico is an outstanding figure in the history of Italian and indeed European thought, but not very much has been written concerning the thinker and his work in English. That deficiency has impelled Mr. H. P. Adams, M.A., Lecturer in History in Birmingham, to give us *The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico* (Allen & Unwin ; 8s. 6d. net). Mr. Adams has devoted several years to the study of Vico's works and to the writings of the numerous modern Italian scholars who have expounded, explained, or criticised Vico. Our readers will not be unfamiliar with Flint's monograph on Vico. With the resources available to him, Flint did useful work. But Mr. Adams has had access to material denied to Flint, and has risen to the height of his better opportunity.

This Far Country, by Mr. Harold B. Shephard, M.A. (Allenson ; 2s. 6d. net), is a commentary on the story of the Prodigal. But it is not developed upon ordinary lines. This world is the far country, and we are all lost in it, and yet very near the Father's House, if we would only turn back to it, and what waits us there. It is a bonnily written little book with something winsome in it, something, also, that is real. But, at times, it seems a trifle superficial, and, here and there, unscriptural. 'Some one will ask what right have I, who am no theologian, to speak so. I have no right, if these were my own thoughts. But I am recalling things which Jesus said.' Not always.

Under the title *The Silent Voice* (Bell ; 5s. net), we have a new edition of two works published under the same title in 1916 and later. The authorship

is not given, but it may be said that the author is a woman of strong spiritual and mystical propensities. The book consists of 'teachings' or spiritual communications, as may be gathered from the following quotations: 'The first teachings that came to the recipient were from one who called himself the "Teacher." They were quite unexpected and continued for about a year, coming at irregular intervals, and many of them were concerned with private matters.' 'The identity of the Teacher has not been revealed, but it is evident that he was preparing the way for the Master, who has been teaching at intervals ever since. He speaks to the inward mind of the recipient during prayer, and she hears the words in much the same way as a melody may be heard inwardly in the head, and writes them down immediately afterwards.' Perhaps it should be added that the 'Master' is Christ Himself.

The Reformation and Reunion, by the Rev. C. Sydney Carter, D.D. (Church Book Room; 3s. 6d. net), is one of the most valuable studies which we have had the pleasure of reading for some time. It is a very careful and scholarly investigation of the relationships of the Anglican Church to the other Reformed Churches for about a century after the Reformation. It proves that some things which the Anglo-Catholic has repeated so often and so dogmatically that he not only believes them himself, but has well-nigh persuaded others to accept their truth, have no historical justification at all. It shows how close and friendly were the contacts of even 'high' Anglican churchmen with the leaders of the Reformed Continental Communions, and how essentially all the Reformed Churches were at one in repudiating and condemning many things which the modern Anglo-Catholic maintains not only to be necessary items in the Catholic faith and practice, but to have been always regarded as such by the true leaders of the Church of England. The whole argument is fully documented. The price of this excellent book is so low that we trust it will find the dissemination its merits deserve. It should be in the hands of all ministers, theological students, and many laymen.

The Rev. W. Wilson Cash, the General Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, whose books on missionary subjects are so well known and so deservedly popular, has written a little book on *Helps to the Study of Colossians* (C.M.S.; 1s. net). It consists of thirty short Bible readings on the Epistle. The writer modestly calls them 'notes and jottings,' but they are written with great freshness and

insight and should prove most helpful to the devotional reader. For freshness take the opening sentences of the Introduction. 'In what is now the very heart of Turkey, near the railway line running from Constantinople to Aleppo, there are the ruins of three ancient cities, Colossæ, Laodicea, and Hierapolis, and all three are mentioned by St. Paul in this Epistle. The site of Laodicea is close to the station of Conjeli on the Anatolian railway. The ruins of Hierapolis are about six miles to the north, and Colossæ is a few miles eastward.'

The Rev. R. J. Smithson, B.Th., Ph.D., writes on *The Anabaptists: Their Contribution to our Protestant Heritage* (James Clarke; 5s. net). It is far from an easy subject. The most diverse 'sectaries' were wont to be slumped together under the common name Anabaptist, though they had little in common but the name. Dr. Smithson has brought to his task real scholarship and unwearied patience. He makes clear, or at least much clearer, what the Anabaptists stood for, and shows how they had very remote predecessors and have very modern successors. The book is well written and will meet a real need.

The Quest for Happiness, by the Rev. Canon C. H. K. Boughton, B.D. (Hodder & Stoughton; 2s. 6d. net), is a very excellent exposition of the Parable of the Prodigal Son. It is commended in a foreword by the Bishop of Leicester, and it is worthy of commendation. Its teaching is sound and its method of presentation is at once simple and impressive. The writer has gathered his illustrations from many fields and he uses them to good purpose. The book makes most interesting and wholesome reading.

The Ingersoll Lecture for 1934—*Indian Conceptions of Immortality*, by Walter Eugene Clark, Professor of Sanskrit in Harvard University (Milford; 4s. 6d. net)—may not be one of the bigger of that most mixed series, but it has an interesting theme, handled with shrewdness and knowledge and lucidity, but by a mind that, with all its learning, seems curiously detached and aloof where, normally, religious people feel in their bones that vast and all-important issues are at stake. Professor Clark, for his part, merely smiles and shrugs his shoulders, reminding one not a little of that good soul Sir Thomas Browne, sitting among the daisies, immersed in a book in the sunshine, while the liberties of England were being won or lost in a pitched battle in the next field. 'So far

as I can discover from observation on myself,' he says, with a touch of proud superiority, 'the concept of immortality plays little part in my thought, and has had no appreciable influence on the formation of my character or on my conduct.' Well, some of the Old Testament saints were in a like case, so far as that goes. And one remembers George Adam Smith's enthusiastic eulogy on the disinterestedness of their religion upon that account. 'Whether the concept is absolutely true or false is a matter of indifference to me. Personally, I am inclined to the view that its truth or falsity lies beyond the range of normal intellectual experience and reasoning. But I am interested in the part which it has played psychologically in the development of human civilization.' In such detached, not to say airy, words does he approach these tremendous problems. One gathers that when the Indian mind clashes with the Hebrew, instinctively his own tends to fall in behind the former. The importance of the individual in Christianity is much overstressed, he feels. 'In this regard the study of Indian thought is almost as sobering as the study of modern astronomy.' The usual Christian criticisms of the doctrine of Karma seem to him blunt and childish; the Christian faith itself appears to him to be degenerating into a mere system of social ethics; it is in India one can study the essentially religious creed really in being; while even the persistent Indian refusal to put an essentially moral God over against a principle of sin, to run the distinction between right and wrong right up and into ultimate principles, appears—though this is not so certain—to appeal to him. Upon the whole this is a rather flimsy thing. Professor Clark is not strong in the religious sense, and so it is rather amateurishly he talks upon religious matters which, in their essence, lie outside his ken.

Oxford is fortunate in its new Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy. Mr. E. R. Hughes, M.A., has published his Inaugural Lecture—*Oxford and the Comparative Study of Chinese Philosophy and Religion* (Milford; 2s. net). It leaves the comfortable impression of one entirely at home in those wide and enticing fields so closely barred to most of us by linguistic difficulties, and of a mind modest, as only the real scholars are, and prepossessingly sane and balanced and sure-footed. This is only a pamphlet, yet it makes us wait with expectancy for what should follow. And even its few pages cut at the roots of vigorous misconceptions that have stood too long. One thanks the author, and wishes him well.

The Sikhs are a great people. And they owe much to their religion and to its first Guru and prophet. Unfortunately, it has not been easy for the ordinary man to get at his teaching, which is, of course, accessible—but for the most part only in large and learned tomes. And so there is a real place for *Thus Spoke Guru Nanak*, a little selection of the master's central thinking upon God, Death, Sin, Salvation, Holiness, Judgment, Destiny, and the like, compiled by Sir Jogendra Singh (Milford; 3s. net). Nanak deserves his sure place in the Indian Pantheon. There is that in his doctrine which arrests and touches and goes deep.

We have received two reprints from volume xx. of the 'Proceedings of the British Academy.' The first is a sketch of *Lewis Richard Farnell*, by Mr. R. R. Marett (Milford; 1s. net). It is done with great good taste and feeling. To Farnell's friends it will be a most welcome memento of a worthy and lovable personality, while to the public generally it will give some idea of the life and work and varied interests of a typical classical scholar and teacher of Oxford.

The second is a lecture on *The Quality of Life*, by Sir W. Mitchell, K.C.M.G. (Milford; 2s. net). Of this we can only say that it is about the foggiest piece of writing we have encountered for a long time. There was a time when students got lost in a maze of unintelligible words in their search for the secret of Hegel. But scientists and philosophic writers of to-day have for the most part cultivated so admirable a lucidity that we have grown impatient of obscurity. What the argument of this lecture is we do not profess to know. We can only give, as a sample, the conclusion and leave the reader to make the best of it. 'Consciousness can see itself as if the source of all values and a creating spring that keeps them fresh, but the values have to be in objects, and the objects to be real. The criterion from youth and age tells as well all the day, for always consciousness does best, and even likes itself best, when it is devoted and absorbed. The rest can follow.'

Church Union: A Fallacy, by Nalhalcam (is it an anagram?), and published by Messrs. Stockwell at 2s. 6d. net, is an attempt to show that Church Unions have not been successful but productive rather of harm. It suggests not union but federation. It confuses between union and uniformity, and is not only here and there misinformed, but here and there self-contradictory.

The gulf between scholarship and the child's mind has become a commonplace with educationists, but it looks as though the Chaplain of Marlborough had succeeded in throwing a bridge across it. In his latest book, *The Roots of Religion and the Old Testament* (S.C.M.; 2s. 6d. net), the Rev. C. H. S. Matthews, M.A., has given us a wholly admirable introduction to Old Testament studies. His language is very simple and straightforward, and his illustrations clear and to the point. The earlier chapters deal with Comparative Religion, and give thus a setting for Judaism which is too often ignored. The history of the religion of Israel itself is sketched with real effectiveness. Mr. Matthews' presentation of the Prophets is that of the nineteenth century rather than that of the twentieth, but he may be wise in following this course. Newer views should be well tested before being introduced into a popular book, especially when that book is intended for children. One or two improvements appear to be possible. There is one serious misprint on p. 104 (xlv for lv), and the diagram on p. 57 would be much more apposite about p. 107. The presentation of Jonah, too, would have gained by reference to the derivation of the name 'Nineveh' (=Fish-house). But these are very small points, and do not detract from the value of an interesting and useful book.

From the T.M. Press, Pallavaram, comes the first number of a new bi-monthly designed to bring before men's minds the worth and splendour of the ancient Tamil civilization and literature. The title chosen for it—*The Ocean of Wisdom* (4s. 6d. a volume)—does not err upon the side of modesty; nor does the wisdom claimed show strongly in the matter of binding, or of the practical editing of the magazine. Three articles, apparently to be continued, break off—two in the middle of a sentence, and one half-way through a word! None the less, one wishes the new venture well. One article claims that transmigration was originally a Tamil discovery; and an interesting point is that, whereas we are frequently told that the cultured modern Indian no longer takes the idea of being reborn in animal form very seriously, it is so taken here, and recent instances given in detail of such cases—for one, a boy who became a cow, and the cow a girl, who remembered all three lives, and described details, all of which, it is alleged, could be, and were, corroborated. Another paper is upon the Tamil poets. As is well known, the Tamil Hymns are said to stand next to the Christian ones for spirituality and beauty. But here we are told of poets who take rank with Shelley and with Milton. But no proofs, as yet, are given. One rather fears for this new venture. But it springs from an honourable patriotism and a pride in a great past.

What is Christianity?

BY THE REVEREND G. J. INGLIS, M.A., WARDEN^s OF STEPHENSON HALL, UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD.

CHRISTIANITY is something easy to recognize but difficult to define. It may present itself in practice as an institution, as an inspired book, as a moral code, as a system of thought, or as a form of mystical devotion. It is, in fact, all these things, for it is a synthesis of many elements, and the problem is to decide which element is fundamental. What is the essence of Christianity? What is that without which Christianity would not be what it is? In considering this question, we may leave out of account the definitions of Christianity formulated by its opponents, and we shall confine ourselves to the answers which have been given by three thinkers of the present century: Harnack, Loisy, and Inge.

I. HARNACK.—When we repeat our question,

'What is Christianity?' our minds turn at once to the famous book on that subject, the work of Adolf von Harnack. During the winter term of the academic year 1899-1900, Harnack delivered a course of lectures at Berlin University, lectures afterwards published under this title.¹ His book embodies his answer to the question; and it is the answer of liberal Protestantism. Harnack asks: What is Christianity? and he seeks to answer this question by asking a previous question: What was Christianity? He goes back to the earliest days of Christianity and finds his answer there.

His answer is that Christianity is the gospel, and this gospel is contained in the teaching of Jesus.

¹ *What is Christianity?* Translated into English by Thomas Bailey Saunders, London, 1901.

That teaching may be summed up under three headings :

1. The Kingdom of God and its coming.
2. God the Father, and the infinite value of the human soul.
3. The higher righteousness and the commandment of love ^{(51), 1}

His exposition of these principles is lucid and attractive.

The Kingdom of God is the rule of God ⁽⁵⁶⁾. It is the rule of the Holy God in the hearts of individuals ⁽⁵⁶⁾. It comes by coming to the individual, by entering his soul and laying hold of it ⁽⁵⁶⁾. It brings to man forgiveness of his sins ⁽⁶⁰⁾, and so it is in the nature of spiritual force, a power which sinks into a man within : 'The Kingdom of God is within you' ⁽⁶¹⁾. It will come as men open their minds to God and to His influence. The second main feature is God the Father, and the human soul so ennobled that it can and does unite with Him. The Lord's Prayer indicates the intimacy of the inner relation between the soul and God ; it is based on the gospel of the Fatherhood of God applied to the whole of life ⁽⁶⁴⁻⁶⁵⁾. Man has the highest value because he can say 'My Father' ⁽⁶⁷⁾. Jesus Christ was the first to bring to light the true value of every human soul. The final feature in the teaching of Jesus is the higher righteousness and the Commandment of Love. This righteousness is free from all alien elements. It is free from ritual, for love and mercy are ends in themselves ⁽⁷¹⁾. It is free from self-seeking ; it is pure in disposition and intention. It is the righteousness which will stand when the depths of the heart are probed ⁽⁷¹⁾. This righteousness has one principle and motive, that of love ⁽⁷²⁾. This love is what remains when the soul dies to itself, and it is a love which serves ⁽⁷²⁾. And therefore this righteousness combines religion and morality in the grace of humility. The essence of humility is pure receptivity, the opening-up of the heart to God.

This is the gospel according to Harnack, as he expounds it in the central section of his book. The later chapters contain an application of the gospel to various problems, social, moral, and doctrinal, but all are to be interpreted in the light of the nucleus, the kernel with the husk removed, which is the only valid criterion. Here we have the essence of Christianity : the Kingdom of God in the heart of man, the Fatherhood of God as revealed by Jesus, and the higher righteousness which consists in love and service.

II. LOISY.—That is one answer to our question,

¹ All such figures refer to pages.

'What is Christianity?' And it is an answer which was not allowed to pass without a direct challenge. Harnack's book was published in 1901, and in the following year his whole position was confuted by the Abbé Loisy in his short but penetrating treatise on 'The Gospel and the Church.'* Loisy sets out to criticise Harnack's answer to the question, 'What is Christianity?' and to set his own answer in its place.

Let us take first his criticism of Harnack. Harnack had attempted to find the essence of Christianity by going back. Loisy accepts the challenge. He, too, goes back, but he does not find what Harnack found. The three features isolated by Harnack are subjected to searching criticism. The Kingdom of God is not, in the teaching of Jesus, an inward influence ⁽⁶⁶⁾ ; it is primarily a future event ⁽⁵⁹⁾, involving the end of the world ⁽⁶⁶⁾, and it was an event which would take place in the lifetime of the disciples ⁽⁵⁷⁾. Moreover, the teaching on the Fatherhood of God was not the central feature in the message of Jesus ⁽⁸⁷⁾. It was not new ⁽⁸⁶⁾, as it merely carried to completion previous tendencies in Jewish thought and devotion, and it did not imply, in the original teaching, any metaphysical relation between Jesus and God ^(94, 97). When Jesus spoke of God as Father and of Himself as Son, He meant that He was the Messiah ⁽⁹¹⁾, the earthly representative of God, 'not only as the messenger or prophet of the Kingdom,' but as 'its principal agent and predestined head' ⁽¹⁰¹⁾. Finally, in the interpretation of the teaching of Jesus, the higher righteousness and the Commandment of Love cannot be emphasized in the manner attempted by Harnack. Jesus was first and foremost a religious rather than a moral teacher, and His religion was apocalyptic in character ; that is, it was dominated by the thought of the immediate coming of the Kingdom. The unworldly righteousness which He enjoined was to be practised by His followers simply as a means of securing a place in the new regime ⁽⁶⁸⁾. 'Love . . . is not an end in itself ; charity leads to the Kingdom, sacrificing the temporal to gain the eternal' ⁽⁷⁰⁾. On these grounds Loisy maintains that Harnack's conception of the gospel will not stand the test of historical criticism.

We turn, therefore, to Loisy's own reconstruction of the earliest days. When he goes back to the Gospels he finds the situation obscure. The

* *The Gospel and the Church*. Translated by Christopher Home, London, 1903. The present discussion is confined to the position of M. Loisy, as it is expounded in this work.

Gospels as they stand are the work of the second generation of believers, and they present a picture of Jesus which has been coloured already by legend and tradition. It is the difficult task of historical criticism to strip off these legendary accretions and to show us the historical Jesus as He actually was (cf. 95-96). In the authentic parts of the Synoptic records, Jesus appears as a prophet and an apocalyptic dreamer; He takes the place of John the Baptist as a preacher of repentance in view of the coming of the promised Messiah and the Kingdom of God. All His thought and work is concentrated on this supreme hope, but when He finds that His message is not welcomed by His hearers He decides to go to Jerusalem to assert His Messianic claim. His attempt to do this led immediately to His own death. Such, in the view of Loisy, was the career of Jesus (101-102, 118-119). He was an apocalyptic prophet who died in the hope that by His death He would bring in the Kingdom which He had preached. That is what Loisy finds when he goes back to the Gospels, and it is something which he cannot accept as the essence of Christianity. The whole method of getting at the essence of Christianity by going back to some period in the distant past must be given up.

Where, then, do we find the essence of Christianity? Loisy replies that we find it in the Church. The Church as we have it is Christianity. Harnack had regarded the gospel as the kernel of Christianity and the Church as the husk. Loisy uses a similar metaphor, but reverses the relative value of the two factors. The life of Jesus is the seed, and the Church is the tree; the potentialities of the seed have developed into the tree as we have it to-day (16). The Church as we have it is Christianity. It has developed or evolved in accordance with its own divine destiny, and only by such development has it preserved its identity. The fact that differences exist between the Church of the present day and the Church of the first century is no argument against this continuity. As Loisy remarks, 'The identity of a man is not ensured by making him return to his cradle' (170). So the Church, in its life of faith, worship, and work, is in itself Christianity. It is the Divine Society, inspired by the Holy Spirit, which preserves its identity by continuous adaptation to a changing environment (115, 178).

We may proceed to ask how far this exposition commands acceptance. To begin with, we may to a very large extent agree with the criticisms levelled by Loisy against the position of Harnack. Loisy was undoubtedly right in emphasizing the importance of the apocalyptic element in the thought

and teaching of Jesus; he was right in pointing out that in the Apostolic Church the Person of Christ holds a position very different from that of the earthly Jesus among His disciples, a position of importance hardly, if at all, inferior to that of God the Father: and he was right in pointing out that the ethics of Jesus have, in no small degree, an eschatological reference. So far we can follow him, but we certainly cannot accept his portrait of the historical Jesus. The main facts in the life of Jesus are historical facts, and not legends created by the faith and worship of the Early Church. To imply, for example, that the Resurrection is a truth of faith, but not a truth of fact, is to assert an ultimate dualism to which the Christian mind can never assent (126-125, 117-118). Again, to say that Jesus was a deluded apocalyptic dreamer is to fail to do justice to the general evidence of the Synoptic Gospels. Jesus treated with sovereign freedom the leading elements, such as the Law, in the Jewish religion as He found it. Was it likely, then, that He would be entirely dominated by one of these elements, namely, the Messianic expectation? Jesus was surely something more than a deluded Jewish peasant. To reduce the founder of Christianity to such a level is to fail entirely to account for the rise of the Christian Church.

And if we cannot agree with Loisy's estimate of the historical Jesus, still less can we follow him in assigning the supreme position to the Church as he conceives it. To begin with, he thinks of the Church not as an ideal but as an actuality; to him the word 'church' means the ecclesiastical institution as it has developed and is developing (9, 166). But we all agree that the Church as we know it is imperfect in fact if not in aspiration; it is imperfect because its members are morally and spiritually imperfect, and for proof of this imperfection we need look no further than into our own hearts. Again, Loisy thinks of the Church as standing towards the life and teaching of Jesus as the tree towards the seed, now vanished, from which it sprang (16). But this is an unjustifiable inversion of the values normally accepted by Christians. The life and teaching of Jesus stand towards the Church not as an initial impulse now exhausted, but as a normative and controlling influence of permanent vitality. Surely we cannot find the essence of Christianity in an ecclesiastical organization formed by the interaction of historical forces among which the ministry of Jesus plays but one part among many. It is our loyalty to its Divine Head which compels us to reject this apotheosis of the Church which is His body.

III. INGE.—So far we have glanced at two answers to the question, 'What is Christianity?' We have considered the liberal Protestant answer and the Modernist answer, and we have seen reason to find defects in both. We may now pass to consider a third answer which has been given, and given by a religious thinker and writer of extraordinary distinction—Dr. W. R. Inge, who last year resigned the Deanery of St. Paul's. This part of our subject follows naturally on what has gone before, because Dr. Inge has taken his place as one of the most acute critics of the Modernism expounded by Loisy and his school. We may now consider the answer which this scholar himself gives to our question. For our present purpose we shall look for the answer in the last three essays in the first volume of *Outspoken Essays*.¹ In the essay on 'The Indictment against Christianity'—an essay written in the middle of the World War—the writer asks, 'Has Christianity failed?' The horror and suffering and brutality of war forced this question to the lips of all. Dr. Inge answers the question by drawing a sharp distinction between Christianity and the Church. Many of the charges brought against the Church—its worldliness, its content with things as they are, its tendency to put its own institutional benefit before the salvation of mankind—are admitted by him as substantially justified (cf. 236-242). He agrees that the Church has failed, but he goes on to say that the Church is not Christianity.

He points out, to begin with, that the history of religion shows that there are two types of religion, the material and the spiritual. The material religion on the whole is moral in character, but its values are those of the world. Good is rewarded by temporal blessings, or by blessings in a future life conceived in accordance with temporal standards. Generally speaking, the material religion makes terms with the world and is content to accept ordinary standards of decent human conduct. In striking contrast with this, the spiritual religion is based on a complete transvaluation of the values normally accepted. The things upon which the world sets great store, such as riches, honour, and success, count for nothing in the minds of those who are spiritual, for their thoughts and desires are turned away from the temporal and directed towards the eternal world. Into this eternal world they are lifted up by their acceptance of the true standard

of values—a standard which assigns the foremost place to the spiritual values of truth, beauty, and goodness. Hence such a religion consists in a spiritual valuation of life which issues in a stern but autonomous morality (245-248).

Thus the two types of religion stand in sharp contrast, and Dr. Inge has no hesitation in asserting that Christianity belongs to the spiritual and not to the material type. He argues that there is no evidence that the historical Jesus ever intended to found a new institutional religion. He was a prophet and mystic independent of the Church of His day. Hence, institutional Christianity, while it may be a legitimate historical development from the original Gospel, is certainly something alien from the Gospel itself. Jesus never expected, nor taught His disciples to expect, that His teaching would meet with wide acceptance or exercise political influence. It is unlikely that the big battalions will ever be gathered before the narrow gate. Christianity is for the few who can respond to its uncompromising demands (249-250).

In other writings Dr. Inge has elaborated his conception of Christianity along similar lines. He claims that his interpretation, which may be called the Platonist, is at least as much in accordance with the life and teaching of Jesus as the Protestant and Catholic conceptions. The Christian Platonist holds that Christianity is not of this world, but he responds to the call of duty as it comes. He accepts the high morality of Jesus, and he is rigid in his rejection of the demands made by the lower self. The affective aspect of his religion is found in mystical experience of God or of Christ; in such experience, knowledge passes into love, and the Christian enjoys a foretaste of the bliss of the eternal world on which his hopes are set. He seeks to expound the implications of this experience in terms of the noblest philosophy, and so he is led to say that Christianity is the sum and substance of the absolute values (*Outspoken Essays*, 2nd Series, 35).

How far can we agree with this last answer to our question? There is, of course, no doubt that the main features of Dr. Inge's exposition would command the assent of all serious Christians. We should agree that Christian values are in contrast with those of the world—meaning by the world human society as it organizes itself without conscious reference to God. We should agree, also, that for Christians there is an eternal world in which the Christian values are realized, and which is their true spiritual home. And we should agree that Christianity finds its consummation on earth in mystical communion with Christ. But surely

¹ *Outspoken Essays*. London, 1919. The last three Essays deal with 'Institutionalism and Mysticism' (1914); 'The Indictment against Christianity' (1917); and 'Survival and Immortality' (1917).

there are objections to be made to this exposition of the essence of Christianity. It is true that in the teaching of Jesus and in His life as recorded in the Gospels, there is little place given to the institutional aspect of religion. It is true that in the Gospels we find the prophet; but it is none the less true that in the Pauline Epistles we find the Church. In those Epistles, written between twenty and thirty years after the death of Jesus, and probably before the earliest of the Gospels, we do not find the disciples of the deceased teacher referring constantly to the earthly words and deeds of their late Master. On the contrary, we find a religious society, united in a common faith, worship, and service, and owing allegiance to the risen Jesus as the Divine Head of their community. We find, also, that while there is little or no reference to the example of the earthly Jesus, there is a constant emphasis upon the spiritual inspiration bestowed by the risen and glorified Christ. The Church of the earliest days developed out of the life and work of Jesus, and in so far as we regard such a development as legitimate, we cannot say that institutional Christianity is something alien from the gospel itself. Again, Dr. Inge acknowledges Plato as his master in philosophy, and, after all, Plato was primarily a philosopher and not a religious teacher. May we not say that Christian Platonism is too much of a philosophy to offer a message of help to mankind as a whole? It sets out a noble ideal of goodness, but does it offer man the help which he needs to enable him to attain that ideal? And this leads us to the third comment which we might make upon this teaching. To Dr. Inge, Christ is the embodiment of the highest values, and His Resurrection is an assurance that these values are bound up with ultimate reality. But does this conception of Christ do justice to the words of Jesus Himself and to the place which He has filled in the mind and heart of His followers? Jesus came not only to reveal new standards of value, but to give His life a ransom for many (Mk 10⁴⁵). His own self-sacrifice was undertaken in order that He might free men from the power of sin (Lk 22³⁷). The most characteristic aspect of Christian experience is surely the experience of forgiveness, and this experience stands in the closest possible relation to the death of Christ upon the Cross. In the experience of countless Christians, Christ has figured not as the revealer of a new standard of values, but as the personal Redeemer who gave Himself up as a sacrifice for man's sin, and who is still as ready to bring the gift of the divine forgiveness within man's reach as He was

in the days when 'Love's redeeming work' was done.

We have now considered three answers to our original question. We have seen that they differ widely, and that there are defects in each. Why do they differ? Why should three representative Christians differ so widely in their view of what constitutes the essence of Christianity? They differ because, in the first place, Christianity is a big thing—it is the biggest thing there is—and no one mind can take the measure of it. Each Christian is bound by his own limitations to be selective in his apprehension of Christianity, and to regard some aspect or part as constituting the essence of the whole. Thus, to Harnack the essence of Christianity is the gospel, to Loisy it is the Church, and to Inge it is the absolute values. And this leads us to a second explanation of the difference. The aspect which each selects as central is largely determined by his personal characteristics and his religious environment. Each of our authorities is a scholar who has devoted a lifetime to the study of Christianity. But Harnack was a member of the Lutheran Church, which emphasizes the personal relation between the soul and its God, and therefore he regards the prophetic element as constituting the essence of Christianity. Loisy, on the other hand, was a French Catholic devoted to the Church, and he naturally assigns the supreme place to the ecclesiastical institution, while Inge, as an Anglican philosopher, finds in Christianity that which embodies and substantiates those values to which philosophy assigns an absolute character.

We have seen reason to be dissatisfied with the answers to the question with which we started. The cause of that dissatisfaction is not far to seek. There is only one answer to this question which will satisfy me, and that is the answer which I alone can give. I can answer the question, 'What is Christianity?' only by asking myself, 'What does Christianity mean to me? What aspect of the faith is most real to myself, and why do I select that aspect as central?' Such a process of reflection, honestly undertaken, will be of high value. It will show me how far I have failed to apprehend the faith in its fulness, and it will foster that humility which is the essential pre-condition of Christian progress. And it is surely worthy of note that a process of thought which begins as an examination of the essence of Christianity will end as an examination of myself. The subject of the examination becomes the examining agent. Does this exhibit the operation of that judgment which hath been committed unto the Son?

Some Outstanding New Testament Problems.

VIII. The Historical Jesus: A Study of Schweitzer and After.

BY PROFESSOR C. J. CADOUX, M.A., D.D., MANSFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD.

NOTWITHSTANDING the tendency of some moderns to belittle the religious value of what they call 'knowing Christ after the flesh,' and the tendency of other moderns to declare that it is impossible to know for certain more than a very little about Him, a sound instinct still continues to rivet Christian attention to the story of Jesus and to keep alive an untiring quest for the truth concerning Him. As Lecky wrote long ago, the Church, amid all its failings, 'has preserved, in the character and example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regeneration'; and in *Lux Mundi* Moberly laid down the important rule: 'Councils, we admit, and Creeds, cannot go behind, but must wholly rest upon the history of our Lord Jesus Christ.' An attitude of indifference to the historical facts regarding His life on earth is therefore foredoomed to condemnation and failure.

So long as the primary stress could be laid on the Church's traditional doctrines of His Person and Work, and attention was more or less limited to those passages of the Gospels which served—or could be forced to serve—as illustrating such doctrines, no difficulty arose. Even later, when Christians began to sit loose to certain parts of the doctrinal system, and to study with greater care the Gospel-narrative as a whole, no serious problem was encountered, so long as one could still treat Jesus as a prophetic herald of the Fatherhood of God and a teacher of personal and social righteousness on lines that commended themselves to the best instincts of the modern man, and so long as passages which were hard to accept at their face-value could be spiritualized or explained away. When, however, men were brought to see that such passages were too numerous and explicit to be satisfactorily dealt with in that manner, problems of the first magnitude arose.

The passages in question were mainly those concerned with the approaching end of the age, the cataclysmic coming of God's Kingdom, the Parousia of the Son of Man, and the Last Judgment. Erich Haupt (*Die eschatologischen Aussagen Jesu*, 1895) and G. B. Stevens (*The Theology of the New Testament*, 1899) may be mentioned as two of the many writers who attempted to interpret the eschatological teaching in a spiritual sense, which would

render it wholly and easily credible to our modern age. But the tide of critical opinion was against them. Two treatises of 1892, written respectively by Johannes Weiss (*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*) and Wilhelm Bousset (*Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum*) had already urged that the apocalyptic teaching of Jesus ought to be taken more seriously: but the real death-blow to the liberal, spiritualizing solution of the problem was dealt by Albert Schweitzer. His views were first expressed in a sketch of the life of Jesus, constituting the second part of his *Abendmahl* (1901). An English translation of this sketch appeared in 1925, under the title *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God* (Black). But his great critical account of work on the life of Jesus, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, published in 1906 (second edition, *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, 1913), appeared in English, as *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, in 1910; and when once his views had become known to English students, partly through this work, and partly through the welcome given to Schweitzer's views by Sanday in his *Life of Christ in Recent Research* (1907), the conviction rapidly gained ground that things could never be the same again.

In Schweitzer's opinion, Jesus' mind was dominated by the fixed dogma of an eschatological programme, according to which the Messianic birth-pangs (which might, however, be remitted by God in response to prayer), the appearance of the Son-of-Man Messiah on the clouds, the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and the supernatural establishment of the Kingdom of God, were quickly to succeed one another in the very near future. The baptism of John was also eschatological; but the Stronger One who would come after him would be, not the Messiah, but Elijah, the Messiah's herald. Jesus was, from the time of His baptism onwards, conscious of being Himself the Messiah who was destined to come in the future with great glory. He kept this conviction a profound secret; and neither the imprisoned John, nor the cheering crowds at Jerusalem, thought of Him as other than the Elijah-herald—a view that Jesus did not correct beyond saying that John himself was Elijah. But He spoke much in the third person of the coming Son of Man, and of the birth-pangs that were to

precede His now imminent arrival. As Mt 10²³ records, He thought that the Son of Man (*i.e.* He Himself) would appear in supernatural glory before the disciples had completed the task of calling the cities of Israel to repentance. But no Messianic birth-pangs appeared and no Parousia; and their non-appearance caused Jesus to alter His forecast. The widely-held view that He changed His plans because of growing opposition and loss of popularity, Schweitzer regards as totally groundless. Jesus now came to believe that the 'birth-pangs' would befall Himself alone, and that in order to usher them in and to appear in full glory as Messiah, He would have to die. He went up to Jerusalem deliberately for that purpose: His death was incurred not by historical conditions, but by dogmatic necessity. The ethical teaching He gave, so far as it referred to social relationships, was purely an 'Interimsethik,' to be practised only during the short interval that remained before the Kingdom should finally come. The Resurrection of which He spoke was roughly identical with the whole process culminating in His Parousia.² The secret of His own claim to be the coming Messiah, revealed at Caesarea Philippi to the Twelve, was still carefully guarded from the rest of the world; but it was the fact of this claim which Judas betrayed to the High Priest, and which Jesus Himself acknowledged in response to Kaiaphas' question. Thus (to sum up), Jesus 'lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws Himself upon it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still. That is His victory and His reign' (*Quest*, 369).

While the interpretation of the eschatological passages in the Gospels is by no means the only important problem concerning the historical Jesus, Schweitzer's work made so wide and so deep an impression that subsequent discussion of the problems of His life to a very large extent relates itself to the eschatological question. In surveying the contributions made to the problem since Schweitzer's great work appeared, it will not be feasible to mention every useful book that bears on the subject: the number of such books is so large that, apart from anything else, considerations

of space would forbid a full enumeration. I propose, therefore, to touch only on those that seem to me the most significant and accessible, and to indicate roughly the lines along which their authors have been working.

It may be noted with satisfaction that, although sporadic articles in the interest of the Christ-myth theory still appear, the broad historical reliability of the Synoptic story is now so firmly established that the theory in question may be said to have been finally exploded. A high degree of scepticism, however, still prevails in certain quarters. The best-known exponent of the view that, although Jesus really lived and taught and was crucified, the particulars related of Him in the Gospels (except so far as they represent the general trend of His teaching) are historically doubtful, is Rudolf Bultmann, whose *Jesus* (1929) has recently been translated into English (*Jesus and the Word*, Scribner's, 1934). Jesus' message appears in his hands simply as God's demand for man's unconditional obedience; the eschatological element is frankly acknowledged, but is interpreted simply as reinforcing the urgency of the demand for an immediate decision. An interpretation similar to Bultmann's is given by another Barthian, K. L. Schmidt, in his article on 'Jesus Christus,' in the second edition of *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (vol. iii. 1929). Other important historical studies of Jesus characterized by an excessive scepticism regarding various important parts of the Gospel-records are those of Eduard Meyer (in *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, vol. ii. 1921) and Guignebert (*Jésus*, Paris, 1932).

Schweitzer's work quite naturally provoked dissent, which in some cases went so far as a denial of the historical trustworthiness of the eschatological teaching ascribed to Jesus. The late B. W. Bacon virtually excluded it from his interpretations of Jesus, whose preaching he regarded as purely ethical and religious (e.g. *Beginnings of Gospel Story*, 1909; article on 'Jesus Christ' in Schaff-Herzog's *Encyclopædia*, vol. vi. 1910; *The Story of Jesus and the Beginnings of the Church*, 1928). A definite attempt to prove this negative conclusion appeared in 1922 in Cyril Emmet's and Lily Dougall's *Lord of Thought*, in which the eschatology of the Gospels and the doctrine of the Fatherly love of God were held to be so inconsistent that one or other of them must be denied to Jesus, and the eschatology was denied as the less original of the two. Two popular character-studies of Jesus which rejected the eschatological teaching were published in 1917—T. R. Glover's *Jesus of History*, and J. A. Robertson's

Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus, though the latter did acknowledge that Jesus sometimes clothed His vision of triumph in apocalyptic imagery. Headlam's *Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ* (Murray, 1923) is a full and thorough study of the story down to the Transfiguration; but it attempts a figurative interpretation of the apocalyptic passages, on the lines previously advocated by G. B. Stevens and others, but now widely felt to be inadequate.

A number of useful treatises have appeared, acknowledging guardedly the reality of the apocalyptic element in the Gospels, but applying strictures to Schweitzer's comprehensive findings. In 1910 E. von Dobschütz published in *The Eschatology of the Gospels* some lectures which he had given a short time before, and in which he drew attention to the tendency of certain Gospel-documents to introduce an eschatological meaning into sayings that were originally quite free from it—a theme on which, in the following year, B. H. Streeter contributed an important closing essay to the Oxford *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*. In an article in *The Hibbert Journal* for October 1911, Sanday modified very materially the rather hearty welcome he had previously given to Schweitzer's work. J. Moffatt's *Theology of the Gospels* (1912) drew attention to the representation of the Kingdom as present (and not future only) and to other features in the teaching of Jesus inconsistent with a purely eschatological interpretation. W. Manson in *Christ's View of the Kingdom of God* (1918) admitted the use by Jesus of apocalyptic forms, but went as far as he could in harmonizing them with His spiritual teaching.

Much more generous treatment has been meted out to the eschatology in a number of recent lives and studies—those, namely, by the Jew, Joseph Klausner (*Jesus of Nazareth*, Hebrew 1922, English 1925 and 1927, German 1930), by B. S. Easton (*Christ in the Gospels*, New York, 1930), J. Mackinnon (*The Historic Jesus*, 1931), F. C. Burkitt (*Jesus Christ: An Historical Outline*, Blackie, 1932), and M. Goguel (*La Vie de Jésus*, Paris, 1932; Eng. tr., 1933), as well as in the works, already mentioned, of Bultmann, Schmidt, and Guignebert. The most important new interpretations of the eschatological teaching, however, are those of T. W. Manson and Rudolf Otto. Manson's *Teaching of Jesus* (1931) is marked, not only by wide knowledge of Rabbinic literature, but by the use of statistics in examining our Lord's use of terms like 'Father,' 'Son of Man,' etc.—with most suggestive results: he interprets 'Son of Man,' in line with Dn 7²⁷, as the faithful

remnant of Israel, which Jesus gathered round Himself. Otto's book (*Reich Gottes und Menschensohn*, Munich, 1934) makes large use of Enoch and of Iranian parallels to late Jewish ideas, and is full of fresh exegesis of passages bearing on the in-breaking Kingdom, the Son of Man, and in particular the Last Supper.

It can probably be taken for granted that criticism will not again be able to return wholly to the so-called 'liberal' picture of Jesus—a picture, that is, which concentrated attention on such parts of His teaching as were easily reconcilable with modern ethical and social ideals and spiritual convictions, and either ruled out as ungenueine, or ignored, or explained figuratively, all sayings of another character. Frank recognition of the eschatological elements in His teaching, and still more the coming of Form-criticism, have shown this 'liberal' picture to be largely untenable. And inasmuch as it was, during its vogue, a painful thorn in the side of traditional orthodoxy, its breakdown has been overhastily acclaimed by some as constituting (or at least facilitating) a re-vindication of the Christology of the Creeds. Attempts have been made (in the interests, sometimes, of credal orthodoxy, sometimes of Barthianism, and sometimes independently) to affirm the historical truth of the credal view of the Incarnation, while at the same time either making the most generous concessions to radical criticism, or else boldly explaining that criticism away, or else impatiently doffing aside the quest for mere historical facts as if they were religiously indecisive. Hoskyns' *Riddle of the New Testament* (Faber, 1931), as well as his essay (and some of the other essays) in *Mysterium Christi* (Longmans, 1930), seem to me to be a little open to objection on grounds of this kind. No doubt it is true that the Christian experience of the living Christ down the ages must be taken into account in any final assessment of the significance of His Person: no doubt, also, it is impossible, without grave inaccuracy, to ignore the numinous impression which Jesus frequently made on His interpreters. But it is a mistake to suppose that the overthrow of the 'liberal' picture of Jesus makes it easier than before to synthesize His earthly history with the precise traditional doctrine of His Person. One outstanding result of the abandonment of the 'liberal' view is to prove that Jesus' intellect was more conditioned by the ideas of His time than it was formerly thought to have been: and this makes it harder, not easier, to synthesize His history and the traditional dogma, so long (of course) as men do not help themselves out by

ignoring Moberly's great canon: 'Councils . . . and Creeds cannot go behind, but must wholly rest upon the history of our Lord Jesus Christ.'

To admit that we can never again be satisfied with such liberal interpretations of Jesus' eschatology as Stevens and Headlam gave is not, however, to surrender unconditionally to Schweitzer. It has often been felt that Schweitzer's construction is somewhat uncritical as regards his use of documents. On the one hand, he lays immense stress on certain special passages, notably Mt 10²³, without allowing for the fact that this passage, having only Matthæan attestation, is of highly dubious authenticity. According to Streeter (*Four Gospels*, 255), this verse belongs to M, a Jerusalem-source in which the sayings of Jesus were moulded under the influence of the controversy with Paul. Unintelligible as a real utterance of Jesus, it is clear and apt as a Jerusalemite damper on Paul's enthusiasm for a mission to the Gentiles. On the other hand, Schweitzer is obliged to set aside as unhistorical various passages which do not easily harmonize with his scheme. Contrary to the evidence, he has to put the Transfiguration before the confession at Cæsarea Philippi. He gives no real place to the abundant evidence that Jesus believed that the Kingdom was in a real sense already present, as well as future, or to the fact that when He gives reasons for His ethical injunctions, these reasons are not, as we should expect, the early collapse of human history, but the essential nature of God (Mt 5⁴⁵, Lk 6³⁵). In general, I submit, both Schweitzer and many whom he has influenced, in interpreting Jesus' outlook and meaning, give far too much weight to the possible sway over His mind of an abstract apocalyptic programme, and not nearly enough to the practical, human, historical situation with which He was faced. He was a righteous, compassionate, wise, and deeply spiritual man, before He was a Jewish believer in an imminent cataclysm: and allowance must be made for the simple implications of that quality of His life, if His more obscure eschatological views are to be interpreted rightly.

I doubt whether we have yet reached the stage at which we can explain with complete confidence the precise meaning of the phrase 'the Son of Man.' No one theory as yet shows signs of winning universal acceptance. But one or two other pertinent matters seem to me easier to settle. I think it will soon be generally agreed that passages like Mt 23³⁷, Lk 19⁴²⁻⁴⁴ prove that, when Jesus began His ministry, He expected to be followed, not repudiated, by Israel. There must, therefore, have been an early

stage during which He looked forward to the cataclysmic coming of the Judgment and the Kingdom as imminent events which would not be preceded by His own earthly death. How in detail He envisaged that coming we do not know. It is by no means certain that He expected it within the next few weeks or months: it is in any case apparent that He wished to prepare men ethically and spiritually for its coming; and such injunctions as He gave to that end address themselves rather to the permanent conditions of life than to a set of conditions likely to disappear at any moment. His ethics are interim-ethics only in the sense that their author did, as a matter of fact, expect God's Kingdom to come within the lifetime of His own generation, not in the sense that they are adapted only to a world-order on the point of collapsing. Thus we may—and ought to—find room in His scheme for those efforts He made to induce Israel not only to repent and improve generally, but also to be conciliatory (instead of resentful and rebellious) to the Roman Government, and charitable (instead of contemptuous) to the Gentile world. The usual idea that Jesus excluded all politics from His orbit is gravely wrong. The study of the political aspect of His mission is one that needs and will repay fuller investigation. Contributions have been made by H. Weil (*Die Stellung des Urchristentums zum Staat*, 1908), S. Liberty (*The Political Relations of Christ's Ministry*, 1916), J. R. Coates (*The Christ of Revolution*, 1920), V. G. Simkhovitch (*Towards the Understanding of Jesus*, Macmillan, 1923), S. Dickey (*The Constructive Revolution of Jesus*, New York, 1924), L. Curtis (*Civitas Dei*, 1934), and others; but the general importance of this part of the subject is still far from being widely recognized. Further, far too much has been read into Jesus' representation of the Kingdom as God's gift, as if that representation implied that man was powerless to do anything to realize the Kingdom, to do anything more, in fact, than be ready to enter it whenever it should please God to introduce it. For a religious Jew it was natural to speak of any 'great Divine event' as solely the work of God; but that did not nullify the duty of man to work strenuously for its actualization. Jesus' own personal initiative and the praying, healing, and teaching activity to which He urged His followers, should suffice to convince us that His language about God giving the Kingdom was framed in accordance with the deterministic thinking and speaking habitual to the religious Semite, and must not be interpreted as excluding human responsibility and power.

Growing opposition gradually ousted Jesus' early hopes of success; and since martyrdom could be avoided only by silence or flight or resistance, He accepted martyrdom. Two consequences would follow from this decision. Firstly, the same hostile attitude that was bringing about His martyrdom would also bring about a Jewish war with Rome, in which Rome would be tragically victorious: hence His numerous allusions to the military disasters overhanging Israel. Secondly, Jesus Himself would be vindicated by Divine power: the rejection of Him by His people would be *shown to be* what it actually was—sinful and blind rebellion against God. The murdered Messiah would not only live again, but He would live in glorious triumph. The actual fulfilment of these hopes is seen in the rise of the Christian Church; but Jesus apparently pictured it as a visible reappearance of Himself in glory within the lifetime of that generation, but on a day and at an hour known to God only. (The predictions of His rising on the third day were probably in the first place predictions of His

Parousia, in which—under the influence of the unexpected experiences of Easter Day and later—'the third day,' meaning a short, indefinite interval, was misunderstood as 'the third day' in the literal sense. This view of the Resurrection-sayings is certainly suggested by the frequent descriptions of the Master being absent for a season from His home and servants, departure and return corresponding to martyrdom and Parousia, without any complication of an intervening resurrection. Moreover, the words addressed by Jesus to the penitent malefactor [Lk 23⁴³] are not easily reconciled with the expectation of resurrection in a few days' time.) That a frank acceptance of the eschatological teaching involves the acknowledgment of some intellectual error in Jesus must be faced. On the theory here advanced, the error would be limited to the *form* which He expected His triumph to take: it would not affect His expectation of triumph as such, nor (so far as we can judge) the substance of His beliefs as to what was in store for the world had Israel accepted and not rejected Him.

In the Study.

Virginibus Puerisque.

Rhythm.

BY THE REVEREND T. GREENER GARDNER, MATLOCK.

'These all continued with one accord . . . '—Ac 1¹⁴.

I WONDER if you noticed the general comment about the last University Boat Race? It was a comparison between the two crews, the commentators saying that the winning crew had a better sense of rhythm, their blades entering the water at the same moment, their rowing being a very fine sight to watch. It is very evident that the winning crew had learnt what is necessary for all to learn—that only as we find the law of harmony which governs what we are undertaking are we likely to succeed.

The dictionary says that 'rhythm' is 'flowing motion, timed movement.' Such a definition gives us some idea of the importance of the word.

If you are running in a race, unless you can get rhythmic movement there is very little hope of your winning the race; once you are off your balance, you must of necessity lose speed.

If you know anything about music, you know how important are the laws of harmony for correct interpretation of the printed page. There must be timed movement, the flowing motion. This is even true of the music of primitive peoples as well as of the compositions of the great masters of civilization. The beating of the drums in Africa's jungle communities will send the people into ecstatic dancing. Drums can be so used that they give messages of joy or sorrow, tell of victory or defeat. Even the stranger to their language feels the power and influence of the rhythmic beating of the drums.

In our national songs, and in our hymns of praise, you will find there is a mystic harmony of word and sound, and because of this these songs are able to touch us to the very depths of our emotion.

You may apply this same thought of rhythm and harmony to other experiences of life. Suffering in body is largely the result of being out of harmony with the laws which govern the body. Pain and disease are signs of discord. The work of the physician is to establish harmony, and when he succeeds we return to health.

The same is true of the mind as the body—our perplexity comes because we lack the knowledge of the laws which make harmony in the mental world. When we discover those laws and live according to their dictates we find peace.

Sin is discord—the losing of spiritual rhythm, and the effect of the discord is seen all around us.

When we pray to God, it is because we are seeking to live a harmonious life in accordance with the laws of God, and when we are obedient to these laws we, too, know what people mean when they speak of the guidance of God.

You remember the story of Pentecost—the result of the day of Pentecost was due to the harmony of mind and soul of the disciples with the laws of God.

The writer of the Acts of the Apostles tells us they were all of one accord. They had found rhythm and harmony—they were all like minded—in correspondence; and, because of this, they saw the most remarkable revival of religion ever known to them. There were thousands of people who listened to the sermon of Peter and accepted the leadership of Jesus.

When the Apostle Paul wrote to the Corinthians he asked them this question, 'What concord hath Christ with Belial?' He was asking them in words which they understood, what harmony could there be between good and evil, but He was trying to show the extremes of both—Jesus was the finest example of goodness the world had known; 'Belial' represented the other extreme—the extreme of evil, and between good and evil there can never be harmony.

Thus you may very readily see what a place rhythm must have in all the transactions of life. It is important for the crews of the Universities—they must know rhythmic movement. It is equally necessary for a runner to find a flowing motion. The musician would be completely lost if he could not interpret the laws of harmony. The Christian can only be Christian and know God when he lives in harmony with the laws of God.

I think this conception of harmony between God and man makes Pentecost and its wonderful experience understandable to all of us. The disciples in prayer and worship found harmony with God and were able to deliver His truth to the listening crowds. We are quite prepared to believe that in our sports and in our music there must be a knowledge of certain laws and harmony with them—well, the same is true if we would live the Christian life. We must be in harmony with the laws of God. Pentecost was an experience

because the disciples found this harmony. They were of one accord.

Hobson's Choice.

BY THE REVEREND SIDNEY H. PRICE, GREAT SHELFORD, CAMBRIDGE.

'What the Lord saith unto me, that will I speak.'
—I K 22¹⁴.

We all like our own choice in things, and often it is right that we should. It is good for us to have decisions to make. We gain confidence that way. The decisions we make affect our character, and also depend on our character. But there are other times when we have no choice. That also is good for us on occasions.

Many years ago, there lived in Cambridge a man named Thomas Hobson, who kept a hostelry at the George Inn. Whoever came to him received the same honest treatment, that is, he must take the next horse in its turn. This might have been done in justice to the horses, to make sure one was not worked harder than the rest, or it might have been that Hobson was no respecter of persons. Sometimes a man did not like the horse allotted to him. He wanted to choose his own, but Hobson would not allow him to do so. 'This or none,' he would say. So Hobson's choice means no choice.

We must all learn when to make a decisive choice. This does not mean we must be stubborn or stupid, but in some things our choice must be 'This or none.' In the reading of books, for instance, we must demand a high standard of book. There are more good books than any of us can ever read, so we have no time to waste on the second best. When we are faced with right and wrong, we must make Hobson's choice.

In the days of King Ahab there lived a prophet who knew the value of making Hobson's choice. He was the prophet Micaiah. Perhaps you have not heard of him. We do not know much about him, but what we do know makes us admire him. Ahab wanted him to prophesy nice things about him and to support his wishes. It was a great temptation in those days to win the favour of the King, and Ahab had many prophets who were willing to do as he wanted. He was trying to persuade the King of Judah to join with him in a war against their enemies. The King of Judah did not trust Ahab's many prophets and asked for a prophet of the Lord to be brought in. Soldiers were sent to the prison to bring Micaiah to the

Royal Palace. When they told Micaiah the King's business, and advised him to comply, Micaiah replied, 'As the Lord liveth, what the Lord saith unto me, that will I speak.' He made his choice between pleasing God and pleasing Ahab, and in consequence was sent back to prison to die.

When it is a question of right or wrong it must be Hobson's choice. The truth or nothing. We may have to pay dearly for doing the right thing, but as a reward, we shall gain a character that will make us trusted by others.

The Christian Year.

TRINITY SUNDAY.

Jesus and Nicodemus.

'Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God.'—Jn 3^d (R.V.).

The conversation between Jesus and Nicodemus is difficult to explain because it takes such an unheard-of turn. We, too, conduct such conversations with each other; and also preferably by night, as it happened in this instance. Sometimes in the course of the arguments and the counter-arguments we approach each other as from a far distance. Never is there more of a barrier between us, separating us as a high mountain, than when we talk about God; at best we come just near enough to each other for each one to see the steep sides of the mountain. Then we say to one another: 'You see God in one way, I see Him in another.' We rejoice that, to this extent, we have come together. Each one leaves the other with his own views. And this we call tolerance; and we are proud of it.

The conversation of Jesus with Nicodemus takes a wholly different course; it begins just at the point where our conversations end. Nicodemus has no other intention than to lead a cautious, tolerant, religious conversation as from one bank of a stream to the other. 'Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God.' But he had scarcely opened his mouth when the Teacher stopped and silenced him, saying: 'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God.' All the cards of Nicodemus were struck from his hand. He finds himself face to face with something new and incomprehensible, something that he cannot fathom. 'Nicodemus saith to him: How can a man be born again when he is old?' There is to be no carefully moderated talk from shore to shore, in which

each will maintain his own opinions. Nicodemus suddenly finds himself in the middle of the stream—the ground taken from under his feet. He can not take a position of his own or engage in a genuine exchange of opinions. The time for tolerance was past; a choice had to be made—'Either—or'; he was at a point where he had to fight for his life. 'Jesus answered: Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' Nicodemus stammered: 'How can these things be?' Jesus answered: 'Art thou the teacher of Israel and understandest not these things?'

This text was the burden of George Whitefield's impassioned preaching. 'Why, Mr. Whitefield,' inquired a friend one day, 'why do you so often preach on *Ye must be born again*?' 'Because,' replied Mr. Whitefield solemnly, looking full into the face of his questioner, 'because *ye must be born again*!'

Let us consider this conversation more in detail. We are more like Nicodemus perhaps than we think. He was, indeed, a Jew, but he stood as a Jew with his Judaism about where we stand with our Christianity. 'Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God.' Why could not Jesus be content with his manner of approach? Do the words of Nicodemus differ widely from what we think and say of Jesus? We agree among ourselves that He has been a leader in religious things, that it is worth while to take cognizance of that which He did and willed to do, that He ranks, by comparison, higher than the other religious leaders of humanity, that we do well to let the light that radiates from His words fall upon our ways and views. That is the average opinion. That is the substance of our Christianity.

Nicodemus, however, did not content himself with holding this opinion about Jesus; he went further and drew inferences from it. He was a serious inquirer and desired to enter into conversation with Jesus whom he honoured and from whom he expected help. He had real questions, earnest burning questions; and now he wished for once to hear what answers Jesus had to give to his questions. He was of a reflective mood and suffered acutely enough, under the thick darkness of life, to be attracted powerfully by the light which he beheld in Jesus. Laden with serious questions Nicodemus must have come to Jesus and begun his conversation: 'Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God.'

Jesus answered: 'Verily I say unto thee, Except a man be born anew he cannot see the kingdom of

God.' What kind of an answer is this ! It means nothing else than that Jesus denies, even with His first words, that Nicodemus has any ability to understand Him. Jesus says to him : ' You want to speak with Me, want to let the light of the Kingdom of God fall through Me upon your questions ? Do you think this is so simple ? Do you have eyes for this light ? It may be possible that I cannot show it to you, because in the main you cannot see it. Let Me tell you : When one is not begotten of the Spirit, born anew, he cannot see the Kingdom of God. Think for yourself whether you are really meeting the requirements for understanding Me and My words. Then come back with your questions, if you still wish to put them in this way.' This is Jesus' answer to Nicodemus ; and perhaps he has ears to hear it !

Jesus saw Nicodemus standing, as it were, under a roof that kept him from looking toward heaven. He could not show him heaven at all, as long as he was under the roof, even though He would have taken endless pains. Therefore He did the only thing that He could do. He tried from the first to lead him under the open heavens, to place him upon wholly new ground. So it was intended—this merciless saying—' Except one be born anew . . . ' He gave him a sharp jolt ; but it was necessary. Even as it may become necessary to awaken one out of a dangerous dream. Nicodemus did not see at all what was involved when the conversation was to be about God. He thought only of *his* questions, *his* needs, *his* concerns. He wished, even though in a refined and deep sense, to confirm his own opinion on the authority of Jesus. But Jesus would not permit Himself to be used in this way. Our very questions are evidences that, notwithstanding all our piety and prudence and religious zeal and subtleties, we are still sticking under the roof, where one cannot see the heavens. We must not expect that, regardless of where we are standing, these questions will allow themselves to be solved. We must come forth from under the roof, then the questions will cease. We must recognize that God wants us for Himself, then we shall not think so much about always getting something from Him. He must enter into the centre of our life, then much that to-day troubles us and oppresses us will of itself come to the brim, overflow, and run away.

But for this we must be born anew. We will not ask : ' How can this be, how may I bring it to pass ? ' Else we shall give proof again that of all this we have understood nothing. Nicodemus had to learn, and we must learn with him, that our

religious opinions, views, feelings, matter nothing. All this is ' flesh.' And ' the flesh profiteth nothing.' The Spirit alone availeth. ' That which is born of the Spirit, that is spirit.' The Spirit, however, is a part of life out of the other world, out of eternity. ' The Spirit bloweth where it will.' We stand before God when we say ' Spirit ' ; live by His grace. We can come to God only through God Himself. He is the new man who knows that he comes *to* Him because he comes *from* Him. That is the mystery in the life of Jesus. He was Himself the new man born of God, and lived wholly by God's incomprehensible strength. With Him there is no room for religious dreams ; no ways are prescribed how we, without God, can come to God. But He said of Himself : ' I am the Way ! He that hath ears to hear let him hear ! ' ¹

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Fear.

' Perfect love casteth out fear : because fear hath torment.'—I Jn 4¹⁸.

Fear is the disease of the age—the universal disease. Neurasthenia, in all its multifarious forms and disguises—jeered at only by those who know nothing about it—is almost wholly a disease of fear. ' And fear hath torment.' Fear of the past—theological fear : fear made monstrous by the exaggeration and distortion of sin, and of God's relation to it, in traditional dogma. A fear that can be destroyed, ' cast out,' by God's love in Christ—in Christ's wonderfully simple and comprehensive and unconditional doctrine of the Divine forgiveness—that Christ is God's forgiveness, whether we know it or not.

That is what Christ's cross means. The Apostle does not say that reason casts out fear. We think it ought to : but it doesn't. Why ? Because reason is overrated, as Bergson contended in his *Creative Evolution* ; and modern psychology is making doubly certain. We are much more, and much other, than reason. Let reason take you as far as it can, in any direction in which it can operate. But there are wide territories where it is completely sterile. Turn your reason on against your fears : and see what happens. In some cases quite a good deal ; in others, something ; but in many, nothing at all.

So the Apostle does not appeal to the will to cast out fear, nor to the reason. He knows that the

¹ K. Barth and E. Thurneysen, *Come, Holy Spirit*, 101.

source of fear lies neither with the will nor with the reason, but with the emotions, which go deep down into what modern psychology calls the subconscious. And neither the will nor the reason has any control over the subconscious, where nine-tenths of our total personality and our motives lie. For our personality is both conscious and subconscious. We have little or no control over the vital processes that sustain the beating of the heart and the circulation of the blood, and the processes of digestion and assimilation, and metabolism, and so forth. They are taken care of by a part of our intelligence that belongs to the subconscious, and that is really a far wider area than the conscious and the volitional and the deliberate.

The Apostle says in the text that love casts out fear. And love belongs to the emotions, rather than to the reason or the will. Love is not a matter of reason: you can't love to order: and you can't cease fearing to order. And—as will and reason do not and can not—love does and can command the whole man and can reach right down to the subconscious and encompass the whole personality and deal with the most hidden roots of his being, his motives, and his fears.

Fear hath torment. If a sudden fright can make your hair stand on end, your heart beat violently and set all your limbs trembling: if a sense of shame or confusion in the mind can send the blood flaming to your face, it is too late in the day to question the effect of the mental, or the subconscious, on the physical. There is no better illustration of this than Coué's famous experiment of the thirty feet plank. Lay a thirty feet plank—say twelve inches wide—on the ground, and ask some one to walk across it. Any one could do it without thinking. But lay the plank across a ravine in the Alps, one thousand feet deep—and hardly one of us could be persuaded to try. Why can't we cross that plank three hundred feet in the air that we crossed without a thought on the ground? It is the same plank; we are the same persons. We summon all the resources of our will—but the will is helpless. We can't do it. Why? Because in the case of the plank on the ground our will and our imagination were not in conflict: but in the other case fear has arisen out of the subconscious and swamps the will.

And it is just here that theology, too, has made its mistake: still more it is just here that all purely ethical systems break down—with their moral appeal to the reason and the will. There is only one thing that can save men and heal them. And that is why, not ethics, not mere rules of right

living, but only a Gospel of Love can save the world. It is not by an appeal either to the reason or the will that we can be healed either physically or spiritually, but only by an appeal to the affections. In the famous story of the dog that saved Verdun, when the dog was shot down a few hundred yards from the last trench its will failed. It was beaten. But it was not at the end of its resources. There was one power left. And only one thing now could give it the motive and the strength to struggle on to help to save France—his master's voice. Love.

Only love casteth out fear. God's love of us, our love of God, our love of others—others' love of us, all love, any love. To try to do it for ourselves at the summons of pride and self-confidence to the will and to the reason to help is to court failure—unless we are in perfect health and perfect poise, and even then both will and reason have their breaking-point. But love has no breaking-point. It never faileth—not the real thing. Love arms trembling hands and sinking knees, where the will is powerless to give strength. Only love, which makes us fearless, will carry us across the gulf.

Reason will argue: love never does. Will and reason certainly can help. But alone they will not save in the hour of temptation. We know all the arguments—everybody does, but only love will save—loving some one better than ourselves—supremely the love of Christ. Fear is stupid and dangerous. Some fear is protective, of course, although most fear is imaginary; but imaginary fears are as real and pathological as cancer. The only cure for a disease whose origin is in the emotions is with the emotions. Fear has nothing to do with the will; all our will may be concentrated against it as our will is concentrated against the fear of the height, but we go on fearing: the imagination holds eyes and head and limbs in thrall against all the concentration of the reason.

Only love is a physic for the whole man—it alone can reach where fear breeds. The love of the cat that went back into the blazing house to fetch her kittens, and was found afterwards a charred cinder by their side. Any love that is truly love—but supremely the perfect love—the love of God in Christ: for the best of our loving is liable to break down and prove a broken reed, because we can't love enough. We doubt, we fear, we tremble, but we can do it, we can bear it, because God's love in Christ enfolds us. Only love can tackle fear and chain it: for—to say it yet again—love goes where the writ of the reason and of the will does not run. But there is something even better than tackling and chaining fear. Perfect love *casteth out fear*.

Studdert Kennedy used to tell that when he first got out to the front line he was terribly frightened—paralysed by fear. He brought his reason to bear, and all the force of his will—he was an officer and a chaplain, with special responsibility for a good example. He willed not to fear: but he feared damnably: and disastrously. Until suddenly he realized that Christ was by his side all the time. He was Love-enfolded, and the fear went away and never came back.¹

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

If God withdraw, What then?

'I say unto you, That none of those men which were bidden shall taste of my supper.'—Lk 14²⁴.

It is not always wise to utter a religious platitude in the presence of Jesus. As we know from familiarity with the story, He had been invited, on a certain Sabbath day, to take dinner in the house of a Pharisee, in company with other religious men. The purpose of the gathering was that they might question this disconcerting and disturbing young Man.

Our Lord's teaching was in the form of stories, and He talked to these Pharisees especially about a virtue that they did not at all understand, the virtue of humility. Then at the end He happened to use a phrase about the resurrection of the just, which elicited from one of the guests the observation, 'Blessed indeed is he that eateth bread in the kingdom of God.' Now that was a platitude—one of the phrases very common among religious people that might mean a great deal, or might mean nothing. Our Lord said to him substantially: 'Do you think so? Let Me tell you another story.' And then He told him the story which we call the Parable of the Great Supper. The point of this Parable is very often missed because of the beauty of its conclusion. The real point is not the generosity of the host toward the poor, but the utter lack of courtesy and appreciation on the part of those who were originally bidden to the feast.

First we want to emphasize how continually our Lord presents the attitude of God in offering salvation to men in the form of invitation. Christianity is not designed to compel or force anybody against his will, or against his reason, to do something or be something that is contrary to his own desire. We cannot imagine a supper, where any hospitality is expressed at all, which people are compelled to attend. So our Lord describes the attitude of God

to the world as that of a bountiful provider, who invites us to partake of His hospitality. And the other thing that needs to be pressed is that Jesus continually thinks of that participation in the mercy of God in the similitude of a feast. The Pharisee, of course, invested religion in his thoughts with gravity and profundity, and with a certain gloom that still lingers in our modern world, but Jesus gave to us the most joyous conception of God that the world has. We get to the heart of the matter when we realize this: that there is just one thing on the part of those invited that our Lord wants to find, and that is some kind of eagerness, some kind of courtesy, some kind of generosity. And it is on that background of God's wide-hearted generosity that our Lord has sketched the tragic shortcomings of people who, all their lives, have enjoyed high privilege; for all those present at that feast—as indeed those also who were involved in the story—were men of position in the community.

When the time came for them to fulfil their promised obligations they all straightway began to make excuse. Is not the way in which church-people accept, or seem to accept, the ineffable mercies of God as a right, one of the reasons why those outside the Church do not take as much interest in our teaching as we think they should? If we really were aware of the value of pardon, then surely the world ought to see that in the passionate eagerness with which we reach after the mercy of God. But the truth is that, like those Pharisees, we have been accustomed to the Church all our lives, and are highly charged with religious phrases and platitudes, and can make exceedingly clever use of them. Whereas the real test of life is to be measured by the thoroughness and the downright necessity of the heart fulfilling the meaning of the divine invitation. And that is where these Pharisees failed, and our Lord made His point that under no circumstances was ecclesiastical attitude, or high religious status, to be taken into account.

But let us consider these excuses. They are all modern when we look into them. The first man's excuse is very apologetic. Likely he had not had any land at all before, and probably he felt very much set up when he got the invitation to a great house, but the acquisition of a little landed property changed his whole attitude towards the world.

Then our Saviour advances to a second, and this is a more pointed observation, for this man was scarcely apologetic at all. He was not struggling for status, having already arrived. He could buy five yoke of oxen at once. Our Lord most drastically sketched that type of man in the last thrill of His

¹ H. E. Brierley, *Freedom and Faith*, 77.

life in the story of Dives, where the seeming value of life can be extracted in three things—what to eat, and what to drink, and what to wear. He fared sumptuously every day ! And this man had bought five yoke of oxen. A German philosopher in our own time, brooding very faithfully upon the trends of our Western world, has introduced a new phrase in our religious vocabulary when he speaks of the new kind of asceticism that has come upon us. The asceticism of the Early Church was one in which men and women fled from the world, and took delight in sacrificing their desires to save their souls by religious exercises. But what this German writer means by the new asceticism is one where men, for the sake of worldly success, are quite willing to sacrifice everything else. So we can imagine this man who is in a hurry to prove his five yoke of oxen, and whose very intensity of desire causes him to put his material gains before his implied obligations.

That is one of the frequent causes of the breakdown of the home to-day on both sides of the Atlantic. In his absorption in the market nothing else matters, until in mid-life, at the very time of the spirit's greatest possibilities and life's finest opportunities, we find a man a stranger in his own home, not understanding his wife, not knowing what is going on in the heads of his children. His aim in life is to get, to acquire. One of the most heart-breaking phrases comes from friends who say, 'I am very sorry, but business obligations make it impossible.'

Then our Lord passes to a third excuse that touches our young and growing families very closely. This man did not trouble to make any apology, but said quite bluntly, 'I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.' We have had that same thing over and over again with young married people. They were earnest and sincere workers of the Church until they married, and then they said the economic problem of setting up in life caused their Church life to go by—making marriage an excuse for neglecting to cultivate the very thing without which marriage could hardly be a success.

So our Lord spoke of these three types. And He went on to say that not one of the men invited was to taste of the supper. If we have observed our own time—looked around us over every phase of society in England or the United States—we will see it being fulfilled in the most remorseless way. There is nothing so pitiful as the endeavour of men to get their five yoke of oxen, to have home surrounded with every luxury, and then beginning

to long for the thing they have neglected and left behind, and now never, never to be able to find. There is one of the laws of Moses where a very profound principle is involved, where the farmer is forbidden to glean all the wheat out of the corners of his field, or all the grapes from his vineyard. For, says Moses, leave some for the poor and the stranger. But here is the man who goes out and gets every blade of wheat out of his corners, every grape off his vine. He is choked with business efficiency. He is genuine, and no worse than many people, but he lacks intelligence; he has skill without brains, and he fixes his mind all the time on his one objective. What then ?

It seems that one thing to which a man's mind will turn, when he has outgrown many—shall we say—of the conventions of life, when a man has passed beyond the attractions of the outside world and sits down quietly to take stock of what use he has made of his life, that which will give him comfort and encouragement is not the things that he has done for himself, but the things he has tried to do for others; the influence, the character, the labour that he has builded together for other lives into the constitution of the life of the Church of Christ.¹

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

On Cares and Carefulness.

'Casting all your care upon him; for he careth for you. Be sober, be vigilant.'—1 P 5⁷.

Men make three mistakes about the gods, said Plato: they think there are no gods, or that the gods are not concerned about our affairs, or that the gods will not refuse anything to our prayers and sacrifices. The first of these errors is not directly met in the Bible. Jesus, so far as we know, never met an atheist. Fools in His day might still 'say in their heart, There is no God,' but it would be a practical atheism rather than the atheism to which the Greek philosopher refers. The third error was encountered in the Old Testament; it is reflected in the Psalmist's protest, 'If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me.' But the second error is present to men in every stage of religion, as the Bible reflects it. God does care, says the Apostle here. He is writing to people living a threatened life, and, although our circumstances to-day are very different from those in which these Christians of the first century had to exist, a threatened life has always its supreme temptation to doubt whether God is interested in

¹ H. E. Kirk, *The Glory of Common Things*, 138.

men. It is the truth and power of our faith to believe that He does not leave us to ourselves.

When we see the lilies spinning

In distress,

Taking thought to manufacture

Loveliness ;

When we see the birds all building

Barns for store ;

'Twill be time for us to worry—

Not before !

We are not being left to our own resources in the trying situation. God does care, He will provide for us.

But this does not mean that we are not required to take care of ourselves. 'Cast all your cares or anxieties upon him, for he careth for you.' Yes, but at once St. Peter proceeds to add, 'be sober, be vigilant'; keep cool, keep awake, instead of dropping all thought for yourselves. God's care for us is a profound relief, but it is never meant to relieve us of all effort in the matter, as though we could afford to relax our powers. True confidence in the Lord is not idle security; it requires, as it inspires, careful attention to ourselves.

The Apostle had already hinted this to his friends in Asia. 'Let them that suffer according to the will of God commit the keeping of their souls to him in well-doing, as unto a faithful creator.' Observe the stress on the moral condition: 'In well-doing,' as they continue to do right, to be loyal and dutiful. Otherwise, if we rely on God to protect us without continuing to watch and pray, we are presuming upon His love. To believe rightly that God cares for us is a moral endeavour. Let us, by all means, be 'casting all our cares upon him'; His responsibility for us is the saving truth that comes first in life, as we encounter threats from without. But the supreme function of confidence in God, as Jesus taught it, is to enable us to exercise our minds truly, without becoming panicky, and to be upon the alert against temptation. He who relies on God is thereby fitted to be cool, to take reasonable precautions in view of difficulties and dangers, and to shoulder responsibilities manfully, just as he knows that the supreme responsibility lies with the Lord. But we know the temptation to be careless about ourselves that comes from our very trust in God. When we worry, it means that we feel the whole or the main business of meeting the difficult situation is ours, although God may perhaps supplement our efforts to be cool and on the alert. That is a tragic mistake. But it is as serious a mistake to imagine that all

we have to do is to commit everything to Him and fold our hands. He really cares for us. We cannot tell ourselves or others that truth too often or too seriously. He does take charge of us; it is the deep, strong faith of our religion, which the Lord Jesus has made it possible for us to hold against all odds; our little life, so fragile, so exposed to evil, is of interest to the great God. Believe that truth and receive it daily in prayer and well-doing. But only so.

We look before and after. This is one of our distinguishing gifts as human beings, that we can forecast the future, for example, and anticipate what is likely to befall us. Nothing can ever supersede the use of this faculty. What faith in God's care does for it is to prevent it from becoming a source of weakness to life; for unless we exercise it in reliance upon one who sees far farther than we can, it breeds all sorts of anxieties and apprehensions in those who are sensitive, by keeping the mind in a state of morbid excitement. If we are not to be distracted by thoughts of what is coming on the world, our minds must be moving within the control of faith in God's higher care. But such faith at once calms the mind and enables the imagination to do its proper work by showing us how to cherish hope and to take reasonable precautions on behalf of ourselves. The real effect of belief in the care of God is that it puts us in a position where we do not exaggerate our own importance and so become unduly alarmed and excited. Faith in Him, if it is genuine, helps us to exercise our judgment steadily, to see untoward things in their true proportions, and thus to bestir or to safeguard ourselves for the sake of His interests.

We say, 'for the sake of His interests,' since this is what ultimately justifies our appeal to Him. We sing our fifty-fourth Paraphrase, which ends with the triumphant assurance:

I know that safe with him remains,
protected by his pow'r,
What I've committed to his trust,
till the decisive hour.

But he who sings this, he who says, 'I know; I am sure of the Lord's care,' as he looks before him and projects his mind into the unknown future, is a man who has already pledged himself to be very careful. For the song of faith begins:

I'm not asham'd to own my Lord,
or to defend his cause,
Maintain the glory of his cross,
and honour all his laws.

An active, obedient life, alive to the interests of the Lord, committed to His service—that is the one life in which we can honestly believe that He will be interested. ‘Care for me, O Lord.’ It is no vain cry. But what are we asking Him to care for? What can we venture to ask Him to protect, except a life of moral courage, more mindful of His glory than of our own?

If our most serious concern about what may happen to us turns upon the possibility of failing Him, of living long enough to become undutiful to some of His laws or disloyal to the surrendered life *in well-doing*—in other words, if our chief anxiety, when life is threatened by *things present or things to come*, is about the risk and the need of being good, then, and only then, can we ask our Lord to take good care of us.¹

‘John (John White of Mashonaland) said to his college friend, W. H. Whiting, “Pray earnestly for me to-night! I have heard two voices. One, the voice of my Lord, is asking me to go to Africa. But my mother has written to me saying that she fears it will be death to her if I leave her.”

‘His friend, seeing how distracted he looked, urged him to get a good night’s rest, so that his mind might be clear to make a decision on the morrow.

““No,” replied John, “I am spending this night with my Lord. He will not fail me, nor forsake me.”

‘Next morning Whiting met his friend, whose face shone with a new radiance.

““It’s all right,” said John. “You know the text, that he who loves father and mother more than Christ is not worthy of Him. Last night, my Lord assured me that since I am willing to do what He calls me to do, He Himself will look after both mother and me at the same time.”

‘Later on, after the decision had been taken, John had the happiness and comfort of receiving a letter from his mother, asking his forgiveness for having pleaded with him to delay at such a critical moment. Not only, she added, had her own health *not* become worse (as she had feared), but it had greatly improved. When once her mind had been released to obey the will of God, she had rapidly recovered. After this she remained her son’s ardent supporter in the mission field to the end of her days.’²

¹ J. Moffatt, *His Gifts and Promises*, 217.

² C. F. Andrews, *John White of Mashonaland*,

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Progress.

‘Oh that I were as in the months of old,
As in the days when God watched over me; . . .
When the Almighty was yet with me.’

Job 29²⁻⁵ (R.V.).

1. The ideal life would be a *continuous progression*. ‘And the child grew, and waxed strong, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was with him.’

This is how we conceive of life when we are young. In physical terms we look forward to the time when we shall enter into our full physical heritage. And there the thoughts of youth generally stop, unwilling to think of the days of our decline or unable to think the long thoughts which include the time of old age and weakness.

It is thus that we think of our mental life. Nothing to unlearn, no mistakes to regret, no error taken for truth.

Thus do we dream of our outward life. Week by week we are to go on steadily adding to our accumulated wealth until our competence is won—no losses that will swallow up the toil of years, and leave us bare when the best of our days are gone.

Thus do we think of the life of *emotion*, forgetful that we may squander our love on unworthy objects, forgetful that we may profane our love and so pollute our souls that we cannot love with any worthiness.

And this ideal of steady progression is the ideal of the *spiritual life*. Would that we oftener thought of the spiritual in this way, as a steady growing in grace, a daily increasing knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ! Not sufficiently do we foster such an aim, not continually do we keep such a purpose radiantly before us. This would be the ideal life. But how cruelly different is the actual! Life becomes thin, and bare, and grey. The visions depart and the divine hungers of our youth no longer trouble us, not because they have been met, but because they have been neglected. To quote Amiel: ‘At twenty I was the embodiment of curiosity, elasticity, and spiritual ubiquity; at thirty-seven I have not a will, a desire, or a talent left; the fireworks of my youth have left nothing but a handful of ashes behind them.’

2. ‘Oh that I were as in the months of old.’ Job longs that he might once again live as in the days of old, when God watched his steps and guided him, when he was in his ripe age, guarded by God’s presence, with his children around him, and abundant prosperity attended him.

We look back to the happy days. Miss Thackeray says of Catherine, in *The Village on the Cliff*, 'If she had known how short a time her tranquillity was to last, she might have made more of it, perhaps, and counted each minute as it passed. But she did not know, and she wasted many of them as she was doing now, as we all do, in unavailing hankerings and regrets—precious little instants flying by only too quickly, and piping to us very sweetly, and we do not dance. Looking back, one laments not so much the unavoidable sorrows of life, as its wasted peace and happiness, and then more precious minutes pass in remorse for happiness wasted long ago.'

3. And more, and harder—the sunlight of the dear dead years must not cheat us, blind us to the treasure and meaning at the heart of the day's sorrow. Has sorrow no message? Did we learn our childhood's lessons best when the sunshine was pouring in a glorious flood through the well-remembered windows of the little village school, when the birds were crazy with song, and all Nature was dizzy with delight? Did not our attention wander from the more important things in hand? Is it not so when the sun of prosperity is gladdening our path?

Did Jesus go to school only to the marriage feast, and learn nothing on the solitary hillside, nothing in the desert when He was tempted of the Devil, nothing in the Garden when He sweat great drops of blood? Is it not necessary that He should be the Man of Sorrows as well as the Friend of Publicans and Sinners? Nay! would He have been the Friend of these if He had not been the Man of Sorrows and acquainted with grief?

Are there not four seasons in the year as God made it? Are there not day and night? Are not winter and night of God? Are not they all of God?

O tell of His might,
O sing of His grace,
Whose robe is the light,
Whose canopy space.

also

His chariots of wrath
Deep thunder-clouds form,
And dark is His path
On the wings of the storm.

But when we think not only of our *sorrows*, but of our *mistakes*, our *ignorance*, our *sin*. 'Oh that I were as in the months of old . . .'

Where is the blessedness I knew
When first I saw the Lord?
Where is the soul-refreshing view
Of Jesus, and His word?

What peaceful hours I once enjoy'd!
How sweet their mem'ry still!
But they have left an aching void,
The world can never fill.

Go on!

Return, O holy Dove, return,
Sweet messenger of rest;
I hate the sins that made thee mourn,
And drove thee from my breast.

Is not that something? Shall only joys and sorrows, and not mistakes, and ignorance, and back-sliding, and sin, teach us? Shall these also not *make* us, be part of us? Did Peter's denial or Paul's persecution count for nothing in their subsequent life?

Listen again to Amiel—one who suffered much in body, was sorely burdened in heart, and who died whilst comparatively young: 'I thank Thee, my God, for the hour I have just passed in Thy presence. Thy will was clear to me; I measured my faults, counted my griefs, and felt Thy goodness to me. I realised my own nothingness—Thou gavest me Thy peace. In bitterness there is sweetness; in affliction, joy; in submission, strength; in the God who punishes, the God who loves. To lose one's life that one may gain it; to offer it that one may receive it; to possess nothing that one may conquer all; to renounce self that God may give Himself to us—how impossible a problem, and how sublime a reality! No one truly knows happiness who has not suffered, and the redeemed are happier than the elect.'

There is a note in the song of the redeemed that will be wanting in the song of the angels.

Was Job cheated of his reward? 'I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; *but now* mine eye seeth thee.'

In darkness willingly I strayed;
I sought Thee, yet from Thee I roved;
Far wide my wandering thoughts were spread;
Thy creatures more than Thee I loved;
And now, if more at length I see,
'Tis through Thy light, and comes from Thee.

Jesus, my Lord, I Thee adore,
O make me love Thee more and more.¹

¹ A. Hird, *The Test of Discipleship*, 22.

A New Interpretation of Isaiah lvi. 1=6.

BY THE REVEREND JAMES D. SMART, PH.D., GALT, ONTARIO, CANADA.

It may seem at first sight a rash assertion to say that all existing interpretations of the first four verses of the 66th chapter of Isaiah rest upon the assumption that the prophet could not possibly have meant what the words seem most evidently to say. The speaker is in Jerusalem, it will be agreed, and he condemns the building of a temple and the performance of sacrifices. Remembering the attitude of earlier prophets towards sacrifices and the temple worship, their bitter condemnations when the people cherished these things rather than the true religion of heart and life, surely the first suggestion must be that the prophet is condemning the sacrifices made by his own people at Jerusalem and opposing the building of a temple at Jerusalem. Whether this is the real meaning of the passage may for the present be left open to question; sometimes the most obvious meaning is not the true one; all that I contend is that this is the most obvious meaning. Skinner (*Cambridge Bible*, Isaiah 40-66, 1929), though he eventually rejects this as the proper interpretation, is candid enough to admit frankly that 'the view which does fullest justice to the language of the verses' is that they are directed against the building of a temple in Jerusalem. But, we are told by the interpreters with striking unanimity,¹ this cannot possibly be the meaning of the words. The prophet could not have said this which his words seem to say. Some other meaning must be found for these verses. Therefore by some the Samaritans are dragged upon the scene by force in order to provide the prophet with a temple which he may safely condemn (though no definite reference to the Samaritans can be found anywhere in the entire book). Others have regarded the verses as enunciating only a general religious principle, universally applicable, that temples made with hands are unnecessary for true worship, as Torrey puts it, 'useful but not

essential.' Who would ever have thought of introducing the Samaritans into the picture, or of making the words a general pronouncement instead of a prophetic message directed to a definite concrete situation, had it not been felt that this other which is the obvious meaning must necessarily be excluded?

Upon what basis and for what reasons is this interpretation excluded from consideration? We have not far to seek for an answer to our question. Skinner says that the prophet whose attitude to his nation's temple is revealed by 44²⁸ 56⁷ 60⁷ 66^{20, 21} would not be likely to oppose the rebuilding of that temple. G. A. Smith (*Book of Isaiah*, ii. 460) says more emphatically that the vv. 66¹ⁿ, 'do not condemn the building of the (Jerusalem) temple. *This was not possible* (my italics) for a prophecy which contains ch. 60.' It is not difficult to see what has happened. Certain passages in the book have given the impression that the prophet is particularly attached and devoted to the Jerusalem temple. Therefore it has been assumed that his attitude to that temple must always have been sympathetic. He could not possibly have attacked it or condemned it. And the conclusion of the matter follows so logically that it has swept the field—that 66^{1, 2} cannot mean what they seem to mean.

First let us ask, are there any conceivable circumstances in which a prophet who had a warm affection for the national temple and its worship might have been led to speak in strong criticism of it and even to oppose the rebuilding of it? We are fortunate that we do not need to consider the question in the abstract. We have documents in the Book of Haggai which reveal to us the spirit in which the rebuilding of the Temple at the end of the sixth century was undertaken. Haggai's arguments were clear and easily understood. He stated very definitely (Hag 1^{8, 9}) that God's favour would return to the land, and the people would have prosperity if only they would rebuild the Temple. In his view the people's carelessness about the Temple was the chief cause of God's continued anger and of the country's continued poverty. The rebuilding was begun, and the popular expectation would naturally be that when the Temple had been worthily completed the nation would regain God's favour and blessing. Is there anything in

¹ H. Gressmann, *Über die im Jes. 56-66 vorausgesetzten zeitgeschichtlichen Verhältnisse* (1898), furnishes a single exception. Though disposed to take the words as a rejection of temples and sacrifices in general, he recognizes that the occasion which drew forth the utterance from the prophet was the rebuilding of the Jerusalem temple. But he does not go beyond the bare assertion of this point of view. I can find no trace anywhere that either he or any one else has worked out this interpretation of the chapter.

all this with which the prophet of Is 40-66 might find fault? Is there anything here which clashes with his spirit and his teaching? I would name two points of irreconcilable conflict. 1. The reiterated message of Is 40-66 is that nothing short of true repentance issuing in works of righteousness and mercy can regain for Israel the favour of God. It presses ever upon the prophet as a mighty burden that *sin* is the stumbling-block in the way of his people holding back the day of salvation and restoration. More than any other prophet of Israel this man set himself to the task of winning the *hearts* of his people to a true and deep allegiance to God. Spiritual regeneration was for him the only way to national revival. In ch. 58 he strikes out bitterly at the religious formalities which people are offering to God in place of the obedience of heart and life—'Is not this the fast that I desire, that you should undo the wicked bonds and burst the bands of the yoke, that you should let the crushed go free and break off every yoke, that you should share your bread with the hungry and take the poor and the outcast into your homes, that when you see the naked you should cover him and you should not hide yourself from your own flesh and blood? Then would your light break forth like the morning, and your health would spring forth speedily' (58⁸⁻⁹). There is a strange and notable absence in the words of Haggai of any reference to such duties as these. 'Build the temple,' Haggai says, 'and the evil days shall soon pass, and the good days come.' Haggai's doctrine would to this other prophet be an offering of a false hope, a misleading of people and nation. If the two lived at the same time it might well be expected that the greater prophet would speak out against such false teaching. His allegiance to God's truth would force him to condemn the rebuilding of the Temple upon such a basis as this. God's favour is not to be won by any mere formal religious act such as the building of a temple, but by the obedience of the heart. 'Upon this man,' he says in 66², 'will I have favour, even upon him who is humble and contrite in spirit and trembles at my word.' Upon *this* man God will have favour, and (thus we may understand v.¹ in relation to v.²) not upon those who are seeking His favour by building the Temple.

Surely it must be admitted that when we fit this prophet tentatively into the situation in Jerusalem at the time of the rebuilding of the Temple, it involves no inconsistency in his teaching to understand 66^{1, 2} as spoken in pointed criticism of the Temple party. In fact these verses embody just

what we would expect this prophet to say to such a project as that sponsored by Haggai.

2. This is supported by a further consideration. The loftiness of the conception of God in Is 40-66 is familiar to all. God is the sovereign over all things in whose hands are heaven and earth. He is the Incomparable, the Omnipotent; His purposes encompass all things and all peoples. He is 'the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, who fainteth not, neither is weary, and there is no searching of his understanding.' How would a prophet, who cherished a conception such as this, react to Haggai's teaching which inferred that God requires a temple as a dwelling-place in the midst of the nation? Surely we have before us in 66¹ exactly what we would expect Him to say to Haggai and to all like-minded men: 'Thus saith the Lord: The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool; what is this—a house that ye will build for me! My resting-place!' An exclamation point rather than a question mark brings out the sense of the passage.

Thus, when we examine a definite historical situation we find that the assumption upon which interpreters of this chapter have proceeded is absolutely ungrounded. It makes no difference how prominent a place this prophet may have given to the Temple in his visions of the new and glorified Jerusalem, his spirit was such that it would set him in radical opposition to any project resting upon a false conception of God and suggesting that the nation could regain the favour of God by anything less than a sincere repentance of heart and life.

There is in v.⁶ of ch. 66 a second mention of the Temple which has seemed to exclude the possibility of vv.^{1, 2} containing a condemnation of it. 'Hark, an uproar from the city, a sound from the temple, the sound of the Lord rendering recompense to His enemies.' This verse has been interpreted constantly as representing God going forth from His temple and city to wreak vengeance upon His enemies. But the customary interpretation of these words forces an inconsistency upon the prophet. It attributes to him the viewpoint that God has His peculiar abiding-place in the Temple so that He can go forth from it to do battle with His enemies. Such a view is expressly repudiated by the prophet in v.¹. God never has His resting-place in a temple made with hands. But look more closely at v.⁶ and you will discover that there is not one word in it about God going forth from the Temple and city in vengeance. This verse has been consistently misinterpreted. The prophet

says, 'Listen to the uproar and the sound which are to be heard from the city and temple.' It is the thunderous sound of God taking vengeance *in* the city and *in* the Temple. The prophet in imagination stands outside the city and hears at a distance the sound of God punishing some who are within in the city and Temple. V.⁶, properly understood, furnishes evidence not against, but in favour of, the obvious sense of vv.¹⁻³.

Having found an antagonism between the prophet and the Temple party in vv.¹⁻⁴, and also in v.⁶, it would be of great value in support of our interpretation if v.⁵ should show any evidence of the same antagonism. 'Hear the word of the Lord, ye who tremble at his word; your brethren who hate you and cast you out for my name's sake say, Let the Lord be glorified that we may look upon your joy, but they shall be put to shame.' The whole verse has to do with an antagonism, and the only question is the identification of the antagonistic parties. Most commentaries tell us that they are the Samaritans and the Judeans. Others, such as Torrey, tell us that it is just the universal conflict of the good and the evil. Again we are met with the same strange procedure which we observed in regard to vv.¹⁻³, that the obvious meaning is simply left out of consideration as an impossibility. When the prophet addresses a group of people whom he calls 'ye who tremble at God's word' and is clearly in closest sympathy with them, and when he speaks of these people being hated and cast out by their *brethren*, surely the simplest meaning is that the split and the conflict is *within* the nation, between brothers (as the verse says), between parties of the Jews themselves. Why has this possibility received no consideration, and why has it been thought necessary to fit the Samaritans into the verse like a square peg into a round hole?

There is a verse in ch. 65 (v.¹⁵) which casts some light upon our problem. The prophet says to those whom he regards as godless and unfaithful, 'Ye shall leave your name for a curse unto my chosen ones, for the Lord shall call his servants by another name.' What name can he mean is to be used as a curse? If we can answer that question we shall have identified the two parties. Duhm seems to have felt that the plain meaning of the verse points to the name 'Israel,' for he says, 'It will hardly do to understand this passage as though Trito-Isaiah desires to do away entirely with the name Israel.' But who are we to tell this prophet that he must say nothing so harsh as that? Why should this meaning be excluded

if it is what the words say? It may be that we shall understand this prophet's book better than we do if we let the words say what they will.

The name of the godless people, not 'names,' as Duhm will have it, but 'name,' is in future to be used only as a curse, and God's servants are to receive another name. Place those two statements alongside each other as they stand in a single verse, and it is clear that God's servants are to be given another name because until now they and the godless alike have been known by this one name which henceforward shall be used only as a curse. As 66⁵ says, they are brethren. Vv.⁸⁻⁹ of ch. 65 bear witness to the same fact: God's chosen servants are a seed which is brought forth out of Jacob. The possibility of a division such as this within the nation has perhaps been obscured by the way in which earlier in the book Israel as a people and as a nation is called the Servant of the Lord. But we can detect a change in the prophet's view as the book progresses. Many have noticed this. He ceases fairly early in the book to speak of Israel as the Servant of the Lord. Also, in 40-55 the nation's idolatry is regarded as due mainly to hopelessness, and he seeks by every means to win them from it. The note is one of pleading. But in 56 ff. he attacks their idolatry and unrighteousness as obstinate and insolent resistance to God and as religious hypocrisy. The dilemma seems to press upon him of how the nation can ever achieve its glorious destiny while there is yet so much stubborn wilful evil in its midst. Suppose now that the forces of evil should become entrenched in high places and should have behind them the bulk of the nation. Suppose the prophet and his followers, though hopelessly in the minority, should stand out with prophetic fearlessness and passion for true principles, and be precipitated by this into disastrous conflict with the authorities and with popular sentiment. The nation casts off the prophet and his followers. In such a situation can we not understand the prophet abandoning his hopes for the nation as a whole and transferring all the divine destiny of the Servant of the Lord from the nation to this little group of the faithful? It is significant that in chs. 65, 66 he does not speak once of the Servant of the Lord but always of the 'servants' of the Lord. He is thinking no longer of a nation, but of individuals. If this reconstruction of the course of events is justified, it is quite comprehensible that the prophet should have meant the name 'Israel' to be used in future only as a curse. This assertion was meant as a condemnation of the nation as a whole.

There is additional proof that this identification is correct. In 65¹⁶ it is said that in the new age he who utters a blessing shall bless by the God of יְהוָה . In the past the name of the God of 'Israel' was used in blessing, and the substitution of another name here shows us plainly that it is the name 'Israel' which is to be used no longer as a blessing, but as a curse.

There is a further point of proof that those who in 66⁶ are cast out by their brethren are followers of the prophet. The reproach hurled at these people is—'Let the Lord be glorified that we may look upon your joy.' These are words of scorn spoken in hatred. Who would be likely to claim that the Lord would soon be glorified, and their misery would be changed to joy? Throughout Is 40–66 the glorification of the Lord has one meaning. It is the glory of His advent, the glory of the new and perfect age. It is God coming to vindicate His own. Many commentators have been disposed to take the prophet's eschatology none too seriously, and to discount it as mainly the expression of poetic fancy. This is no more true of him than it is of the early Christians. We cannot disguise the fact that they expected the new heavens and earth to come in their lifetime, and in the same way this prophet expected the immediate advent of the Lord in glory. The inner content of this eschatology as a faith in the absolute faithfulness of God need not be discussed here. It is enough to see that the prophet's eschatology, his hope in God, was the very heart of his message. Passages such as 40³¹ 50^{8, 9} show that it was the source of his own spiritual strength. The followers of the prophet would naturally participate in the same eager expectancy and anticipation. His followers would be the ones who, when they were evilly treated, would say 'When the Lord comes in glory, then we shall be made glad,' and when their more influential brethren desired to ridicule them, this hope which seemed so foolish and so certain to be disappointed would be the most evident and the most likely of targets. It *would* seem ridiculous—a wild-eyed prophet and his poor scattering of followers calling themselves 'the servants of God,' expecting a miraculous intervention of God to make them suddenly kings and priests of the whole earth, and condemning the securely established official nation of Israel, prophets, priests, rulers, and people, as apostate. But, as Paul says, sometimes God uses the foolish things of this world to confound the wise and mighty.

We have identified the antagonistic parties in v.⁵, and we find the verse, thus interpreted, to fit

perfectly between vv.¹⁻⁴ and v.⁶. Our interpretation has this much in its favour, that it gives a plain and comprehensible meaning to every word in these six verses, and that it causes them to appear as a perfect unity, a message which reflects a single definite situation. I think I have also shown why commentators have felt that this plain and obvious meaning of the words must be excluded from consideration.

There is an additional confirmation of the above proposals. In *THE EXPOSITORY TIMES*, January 1934, I produced independent evidence and proof to show that in 50⁴⁻¹¹ it is the prophet himself who speaks out while undergoing severe persecution, and that ch. 53 was written as a confession of personal faith by one who was won to the prophet's teachings after he had died as a martyr to his cause. A passage such as 57⁴ shows the scornful and mocking attitude of the prophet's opponents. 'Whom do you mock,' he says to them, 'against whom do you make wide mouths and thrust out the tongue?' Our investigation of ch. 66, without any dependence whatever upon these former arguments, has arrived at the same conclusion—that the prophet underwent a severe persecution at the hands of the Jewish authorities. This conclusion rests thus not upon a single pillar of proof, but upon two pillars—the evidence in the earlier chapters 50 and 53, and the evidence in the final chapter 66.

The situation which has emerged in ch. 66 is of the utmost importance not only for the understanding of the prophet, his work, and his writings, but also for the understanding of all the subsequent history of Judaism. If a religious separation, such as we believe we have discovered, really took place, and if a community of the prophet's followers, cemented together by common suffering and inspired by a living and vital faith, had its origin here, what effects may these things have had in the future developments of religion among the Jews? They would be certain to have some effect. It may be worth inquiring whether or not we are at the source here of those divisions in Judaism which were later to be called Pharisaism and Sadduceeism. The Pharisee and the Sadducee represent types which are latent among all religious people. They are present under other names, or without names at all, wherever religion is to be found. But how in the history of the Jews these two types became crystallized into two distinct and consciously antagonistic religious parties has never been satisfactorily explained. When the Pharisaic and Sadduceic parties emerge into the clear light of history they are already far advanced in their development. The

question must be asked, of what significance is the historical situation revealed in ch. 66 for the origin of this division? On the one hand, we see the stolid conservative forces of organized religion allied closely as always with the government of the land. On the other hand, we have a deeply spiritual group, separated from the nation as a whole, passionately devoted to the prophetic ideals, and imbued with a feverish hope and expectancy that the consummation of all things was at hand. I do not think it has been sufficiently recognized how closely linked in Pharisaism were its eschatological hope and its legalism. We can understand how the prophet's teaching that the great Day will come when the nation practises righteousness might under a legalistic interpretation of righteousness develop into an almost fanatical punctiliousness about the keeping of the Law. A second point of contact is that we can trace in the conceptions of the prophet and of his followers the origin of that belief in a personal resurrection which later appears as one of the most characteristic tenets of the Pharisees. We can only indicate briefly the evidence for this. First we have the expectation by the prophet and his followers of the immediate dawning of the Golden Age when the righteous shall enter into glory and the wicked shall go down in shame. Then the prophet is put to death and the followers are left. In 53¹⁰⁻¹² we have evidence of their anticipation that their leader who gave them their hope would be raised from the dead that he might share with them in the glorious consum-

mation. Time passed and the great Day did not come. More of the faithful died. The problem arose, would these too be brought back from the dead to share in the coming glory? In Is 26, a chapter which shows clearly that its author was in direct continuity with Second Isaiah, the affirmation has been made. The personal resurrection has been extended to all who pass away before the great Day arrives. Thus, although one must be careful not to go further than the evidence justifies, it seems probable that in Is 66 we have a valuable document for the early history of the Pharisaic-Sadduceeic division in Judaism.

This interpretation of ch. 66 also provides valuable materials for the solution of the problem of the unity of the book. The problem of the unity, however, has in it difficulties which cannot be mentioned here and will require independent consideration.

A very definite basis is provided for dating the activity of the prophet. The end of his life would be close to the time of the rebuilding of the Temple.

Most important of all, the prophet appears, like all the great prophets, standing out for the cause of God and His truth in the midst of His people regardless of what it may cost himself. He has too often been represented as living remote from the actual life of His people, in seclusion weaving His lofty and spiritual conceptions and composing His poetic masterpieces. Here we see Him at closest grips with actual life.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Varia.

THE success of the *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*, which Lietzmann edited, has induced the publishers to undertake a similar enterprise for the benefit of Old Testament students. The first series of contributions is designed to include editions of the canonical books of the Old Testament, but two special volumes will accompany them, one upon the religion of the Old Testament and another by way of a dictionary. The first part of the latter¹ is now issued; it is devoted specially to the archæo-

logical background of the geographical and historical phases in the records of Israel. The articles, which are compressed but adequate, are illustrated amply with maps and sketches. Incidentally the editor inclines to explain the name 'Bethel' from 'house of Lachama,' a goddess, instead of from 'house of bread.' There is a good sketch of the methods and results of modern excavation in the few pages on 'Ausgraben.' Clear printing and deft arrangement of the material characterize what is going to be a most serviceable, up-to-date handbook.

¹ *Biblisches Reallexikon*, Bögen 1-5, von Kurt Galling (Mohr, Tübingen; subscription price M.3).

The very criticisms passed by Jesus upon the

interpretation of the Law by the authorities of His day point to a recognition of God's Law as binding upon men, binding in its true essence as He revealed it. His attitude towards Creation implied the recognition of a Creator, who has endowed men with faculties of reason and good instincts; they can read the signs of the times, if they will, and understand the natural affections of parents towards their children. Paul again argues that the divine 'Law' comes to Gentiles through the created order; it is written in their hearts with its witness to divine truth. The New Testament, in short, regards the revelation of God in Christ as the fulfilment of the divine purpose in the Law and in Creation. Such is in brief the thesis of Gunther Bornkamm's pamphlet.¹ The discussion naturally involves a context of ideas into which the author modestly refuses to enter. What he reiterates is a protest against any surrender to a Gnostic dualism between creation and grace, and also against any evaporation of the distinctively Christian conviction in some fusion of natural law and religion.

In the January number of the *Hibbert Journal* Professor R. B. Perry of Harvard writes as a philosopher upon 'The Meaning of Death.' Professor Joachim Wach of Leipzig approaches the same subject in a thoughtful survey of reflexion upon the problem of death from Schopenhauer to Heidegger.² Such reflexion, he notes, is connected with a practical attitude, either as its inspiration or its justification, but it also springs out of metaphysical preconceptions. In the case of Schopenhauer the fear of death is attributed to a false, selfish craving of the individual for his own separate existence; whereas the will to live is broader, knowing no check in death. Here the philosopher's metaphysic of the cosmos determines his attitude towards death, the fear of which is dismissed as an illusion, unworthy of real existence. Feuerbach, the second thinker to be discussed, approached the problem from a Hegelian standpoint; real life is the freedom of the reasoning, religious spirit which identifies itself with the cosmic principle of love in the natural order rather than with any cosmic force of Will. Georg Simmel also regards death as destroying merely the lower individuality, attaching himself at several points to the line of Schopenhauer in the endeavour to posit a continuity for

the inner human ego as transcendental instead of empirical. Martin Heidegger, finally, falls back upon a metaphysic of being; 'Dasein ist Sein in Zeitlichkeit.' His religious philosophy approaches nearer than any of the other three to what Martineau posits in the profound section upon death in his *Study of Religion*, though Dr. Wach never alludes to this, confining his attention to the four Germans under notice.

Herr Leese's plea³ is for a new and wider synthesis of Protestant piety than any purely Biblical or theological restatement presents to the modern consciousness. It resembles the contention of humanists like George Meredith, who resented the severance between religion and Nature in contemporary Christianity, which seemed to bisect the world.

Earth, the Mother of all,
Moves on her steadfast way. . . .
Into the breast that gives the rose,
Shall I with shuddering fall?

But Herr Leese ignores English writers; it is Goethe's divine 'Mothers' who appeal to him as an expression of the truth adumbrated in Plato's theory of ideas, that human existence is overshadowed by supra-cosmic powers and determined by brooding forces above our ken. The ancient notion of Mother Earth, he admits, was apt to be naturalistic rather than religious, but it is capable of being transmuted into a religious symbol, and still requires to be thus transmuted and translated, if our religious outlook is not to be thin. It is admitted that the Christian faith is faith in God the Father, but the divine compassion is held to require recognition, and the author finds traces of this craving in German mystics like Jacob Boehme, who richly stressed the motherhood of the Deity (though at this point, by the way, the reader had better consult Miss Ewer's recent monograph on *A Survey of Mystical Symbolism*, especially p. 164 f.). Apparently what Herr Leese desiderates is a fresh, frank effort by German Protestants to state the Christian religion in terms of a Nature-mysticism, with its sense of awe and mystery and creative force, as well as of a critical presentation of the evangelical message. Both are held to be necessary, symbolism as well as argument, and especially the symbolism which threw up the 'Mother' idea long ago.

¹ *Gesetz und Schöpfung im Neuen Testament*, von Gunther Bornkamm (Mohr, Tübingen; M.1.50).

² *Das Problem des Todes in der Philosophie unserer Zeit*, von Joachim Wach (Mohr, Tübingen; M.1.50).

³ *Die Mutter als Religiöses Symbol*, von Kurt Leese (Mohr, Tübingen; M.1.50).

Germans to-day seem to be taking to heart Droysen's remark that 'History is humanity's Know thyself.' This pamphlet¹ is another illustration of the modern effort to recover the essential German spirit by going back to the past and verifying some genuine qualities of the true German character in an examination of primitive phases in the history of the race or nation. What prompts the desire is, for some as for the writer of this essay, the sense that Christianity and Germanism have to be understood separately before they can be understood and fused in a vital synthesis. Neither must be regarded as final, in its mediæval form. Herr Vogelsang, therefore, examines older books like the rhymed version of the life of Christ called 'Heliand'—a work of the ninth century, as well as the twelfth-century chivalric poem 'Parzival,' to see how a conception like that of honour, for example, is to be harmonized with that of Christian love. Must not Christianity, he asks, still as then, address itself to the actual problems and passions of the German spirit, to produce a synthesis which is neither sub-Christian nor anti-German? One can detect, reading between the lines, a warning against those who would make a hero of Luther for his German patriotism rather than for his Christian convictions.

This crisp, fresh edition² of the Psalter is readable. Few commentaries are. As a rule they are works to be consulted, but rarely to be read with sustained interest. Not so with the present commentary. The introduction comes at the end and is extremely brief; the reader is plunged at once into the text of the classic, and only at the close is he introduced to the theory upon which the data all along have been interpreted, that is, the connexion of the majority of the Psalms with the cultus, especially with certain festivals and feasts at the Temple where confession and thanksgiving predominated. Sometimes this interpretation is stressed till it leads to strange or at least novel explanations, as, for example, in the case of Ps 32, where the stanza, 'I will instruct thee,' etc., is taken to be an utterance of some elderly priest or father in God. On the other hand, Professor Schmidt removes one psalm from the cultus by interpreting the hundred and thirty-third as a

little ejaculation of delight from some one who has been staying in a cottage where two married brothers live together actually without friction! To reach this result the editor has to cut away the 'beard of Aaron' as well as the words about the dew on the hills of Zion. Another secular lyric is, of course, the forty-fifth, which is an ode on the marriage of Jezebel to Ahab.

Some specimens of the exegesis may be noted, to illustrate the editor's method of handling the hymns. 'His delight is in the service of Yahweh' (1² accepting Lagarde's emendation, since the repetition of 'Law' in parallel lines is unlikely); 'make *my* (not *thy*) way straight before me' (5⁸); it is hardly accidental that ten conditions are enumerated in Ps 15 for the true worshipper's approach—enough to be counted on one's fingers as a sort of private decalogue; the twenty-third psalm ends, 'All the days of my life I will be coming back to the house of Yahweh'; and 32⁶ he transposes with Gunkel the negative to the first clause, reading, 'I did not acknowledge my sin unto thee, I hid my iniquity. Then I said,' etc.; 'the workers of iniquity, who devour my people' are the priests, 'who eat God's bread and call upon him' (53⁴); for 'north and south' (89¹²) read 'Zaphon (a peak in north Syria) and Amanus (in the anti-Lebanon)'; 'has he no knowledge, he who teacheth men?' (94¹⁰); 'I will practise lovingkindness and justice' (101¹, after Gunkel); 'and shed innocent blood' (106³⁸, omitting the rest of the description as a prosaic comment); the hundred and seventh psalm he regards as a unity, since the 'building' of the house means the raising of a family by God's blessing; 'thou hast magnified thy name and thy word above everything' (138²); the last six verses of Ps 139 may have been written by the author of the first part, but they do not belong to that hymn; 'saints' in 149¹ suggests 'Asideans,' but does not imply that the hymn is Maccabean, since its tone is ancient, recalling rather the spirit in which Samuel hewed Agag in pieces.

Since Professor Volz published his 'Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba' in 1903, some new documents have been discovered, fresh criticism of the literature has appeared, and the historical problems of the subject have been often reset. In view of all this the author has now issued a second edition,³ which is practically a new book, arranged

¹ *Umbbruch des Deutschen Glaubens von Ragnarök zu Christus*, von Erich Vogelsang (Mohr, Tübingen; M.2).

² *Die Psalmen*, von Hans Schmidt (Mohr, Tübingen; Bögen 1-10, subscription price M.6; Bögen 11-17, subscription price M.4.20).

³ *Die Eschatologie der jüdischen Gemeinde im neutesamentlichen Zeitalter, nach den Quellen der rabbinischen, apokalyptischen und apokryphen Literatur*, von Paul Volz (Mohr, Tübingen; M.21).

on much the same lines but brought up to date and enlarged. This is a most welcome contribution to the understanding of the primitive Christian message, which drew upon eschatological materials provided especially by the apocalyptic movement. What we have here is a rich, detailed account of views upon the future which were current throughout various circles of belief between the second century B.C. and the second century A.D., when Christianity was emerging from its Jewish environment. The body of the book, devoted to the development of the medley which characterized the eschatological hope, is introduced by a section on the literature. Even in Daniel, the prototype of such apocalyptic prediction, there are various angles of outlook, as Dr. Volz points out—a significant indication of the diversity that characterizes the movement all through; no programme but a medley of anticipations, even within the same book or group; how different, for example, are 7¹⁻¹⁴ and 12¹⁻³ with their traditions! As for the Damascus or Covenant documents, does not the absence of any Resurrection-hope point to the date of this writing in pre-Maccabean years rather than in the first century A.D.? The passage in Enoch (39^{4f.}), which Charles connects with the future

realm, is not eschatological at all but a description of the present age, and 71 is an addition, probably Christian.

Now and then Dr. Volz permits himself to draw some parallels or contrasts. One of these is between the buoyant tone of the Christian spirit and the pessimistic outlook of contemporary Judaism. Compare two passages, not unlike in form but how different in spirit! One is the Apostle Paul's word, 'Rejoice in the Lord; to write the same to you, to me is not irksome, but for you it is safe.' The other is from his Jewish contemporary, the author of Fourth Esdras: 'I have already said, I say it now, and I shall say it again—Those who perish are more than those who are to be saved.' Dr. Volz would not wish to make this apt parallel carry more than it fairly does, and it might be misconceived. But there is enough truth behind it to justify his diagnosis of the situation, that behind and underneath the apocalyptic pessimism which entered into this eschatology there throbbed for Christians an inextinguishable, bright hope. However, as I said, it is not the business of this fine book to display any philosophy of apocalyptic eschatology.

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Contributions and Comments.

The Kingdom of God.

DR. R. N. FLEW has done your readers good service by his article in your February issue, p. 214 ff. But it is very doubtful whether the conception of the Kingdom should be restricted to the Kingly Rule of God, to the exclusion of the notion of 'realm' or 'sphere.' Care must, of course, be taken to avoid identifying this sphere with the Church, and at this point Dr. Flew exercises his accustomed care. So also does Professor T. W. Manson in *The Teaching of Jesus* on, for example, p. 134: 'But it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the society (or People of God, or Church) is not the Kingdom, but only a manifestation or product of it, and that membership of the society is not entrance into the Kingdom, but only a result of the entrance.'

This quotation brings to light a point I wish to make. Professor Manson's classification of the relevant passages shows, I submit, that the idea

of the Kingdom cannot be limited to 'rule,' but must include 'realm.' In Mark the Kingdom is something that can be *entered*, 10^{23, 24, 25}; and something one can be *not far from*, 12³⁴. (For the parallels in Matthew and Luke, *vide The Teaching of Jesus*, p. 118 f.) In Q the Kingdom is something men *enter*, that can be *closed against* men, from which they may be *cast out*, and in which they may *sit down* (Manson, *op. cit.* p. 120 f.).

These passages are numerous, widespread, and give too clear an idea of a 'realm,' for the notion to be excluded from our conception of the Kingdom. It is interesting to note that in your March issue, p. 283, Rudolf Otto's opinion is quoted by Dr. Vincent Taylor: 'While Otto is not willing to render βασιλεία by "Sovereignty" instead of "Kingdom," he thinks that it is better to speak of it as "the range" or "sphere of (the Divine) Sovereignty."'

I have found it helpful to use the idea of 'the moral order' as a stepping-stone to the idea of

'the Kingdom.' Apart from Christ and indeed from God's action with Israel as recorded in the Old Testament, the moralists have developed the conception of God's moral government of the world as being carried on under a moral constitution (*vide, e.g. Denney, The Atonement and the Modern Mind*, pp. 45-55). The Kingdom is a similar moral constitution, only in this order God exercises His sovereignty, not alone by means of moral laws, but by the powers of His grace. Man's sin has ruined in actuality, though not in reality, God's moral order, and God has established, by Christ and in Him, His redeeming Kingdom over His moral order. Thus His Kingdom is a realm, sphere, or range, as well as His rule or sovereignty. But this realm is not the Church.

J. GRANGE RADFORD.

Wesley Manse, Kilsyth.

The Third Gospel: A Hidden Source.

IN THE EXPOSITORY TIMES for April 1935, pp. 326-330, the Rev. E. P. Dickie writes on 'The Third Gospel: A Hidden Source,' being 'a gospel source among the Pharisees.' A copy of this 'dossier' had been transmitted to St. Luke from St. Paul, according to 2 Ti 4¹³.

I believe that this idea is not quite original, as W. Lock, in 'The Pastoral Epistles' (*International Critical Commentary*, p. 18), says that the parchments about which St. Paul gives orders to Timothy are 'possibly official copies of the Lord's words or early narratives of His life.'

Not so keen is H. von Soden, in 'Die Pastoral-briefe' (*Handcommentar zum Neuen Testament*, 3er Band, 1ste Abtheilung, 1ste Auflage, 1871, p. 200), who gives several possibilities, none of these being sure. The first he mentions is that contended by Professor H. J. W. Thiersch, who thought these parchments to be 'Aufzeichnungen ueber das Leben Jesu.'

Professor Thiersch himself writes in 'Die Kirche im apostolischen Zeitalter und die Entstehung der neutestamentlichen Schriften' (*Die Geschichte der christlichen Kirche im Alterthum*, i., 2te Auflage, 1858, p. 158): 'Lucas, der sein Evangelium in den Jahren 58-60 in Caesarea geschrieben hat, benutzte allerdings neben den unauthentischen Privatschriften unbekannter Vorgaenger, neben dem Evangelium Marci und der reichen Erinnerung, die in Palaestina noch lebendig waren, muendliche

Erzaehlungen und schriftliche Aufzeichnungen des Paulus, Urkunden, welche dieser fuer ihn nach Caesarea kommen liess.'

And again p. 177: 'Waehrend dieser zwei Jahre der Gebundenheit (des Paulus, F.) hat auch Lucas sein Evangelium verfasst und zu seiner Apostelgeschichte den Stoff gesammelt. Fuer ihn, wenn unsere Vermuthung nicht taeuscht, laesst Paulus die in Troas auf der Abschiedsreise zurueckgelassenen Buecher und Pergamente kommen.'

So I think it quite clear that Professor Thiersch, though not being perfectly sure (as no man can be lest these parchments should be found again), sees here official writings ('Urkunden') belonging to St. Paul ('des Paulus').

The idea of the Rev. Mr. Dickie proves not to be new indeed, but I think it a perfect chance to renew it and find a source of the Third Gospel hidden till now.

W. J. FOURNIER.

Oegstgeest, Holland.

'The Rest' in Acts v. 13.

THE fact of serious trouble in this verse is well set forth in the recent commentary on Acts in vol. iv. of *The Beginnings of Christianity*, and the editors, after discussing various attempts to remove the flat contradiction, agree that the problem is still unsolved. The desperate hypothesis of an interpolation only adds one more difficulty. The author of the account cannot possibly have said, that as the Apostles and their adherents stood in Solomon's porch, no one of the rest dared join himself to them, but that multitudes of the people were added to their number. The fact must be that the reading of our impossible Greek text is the result of some accident of transmission.

The fact that the Greek of the first half of Acts is the result of translation from Aramaic has been recognized by not a few scholars, among them the late George F. Moore (*Judaism*, i. 185, 189). In my *Composition and Date of Acts*, pp. 31 f., I attempted an explanation of the contradiction in 5¹³ by supposing that in the original Aramaic the verb rendered 'join himself to' should have been rendered 'contend with.' While it is true that the divergent translation of the supposed Aramaic verb is perfectly possible, the explanation nevertheless fails to satisfy. It required no great daring on the part of even the common people to 'contend' with the few whom the Jewish authorities had strictly forbidden to speak or teach in the name of

Jesus (4¹⁸ 5²⁸). A still more important objection is offered by the word *λοιπῶν*, the use of which in this context is certainly unnatural. How could any Greek writer have chosen to employ it here?

That which obviously is needed is a word to contrast with *ὁ λαός*, 'the common people,' whose turn comes in the next clause. Hilgenfeld's conjecture, *Δευτῶν*, was brought forth by the recognition of this need, but could not satisfy it. What class in Jerusalem might perhaps have been expected, at this juncture, to yield at least one adherent to the new sect, but did not? We remember the question put to Nicodemus (Jn 7⁴⁸): 'Have any of the rulers believed?'

It has recently occurred to me that the solution of the puzzle of this verse is to be found in the Semitic original of the troublesome word *λοιπῶν*. It renders *אֲרֵאשׁ*, 'the rest,' and the probability is suggested that this is the result of misreading (or miswriting) *אֲרֵאשׁ*, 'the elders.'

For two reasons the mistake would be very easy. 1. The manner of writing the word 'elders' with a middle *aleph* was only Palestinian orthography; cf. the many examples of this participial form in Biblical Aramaic (*kethiv* only, except in Dn 7¹⁶). In the first century A.D. it was probably an archaism. Moreover, the translator (or copyist) was presumably accustomed to see this word written in the widely common way, without a middle letter, as in the Aramaic of Ezra (five times), and in the Elephantine papyri. 2. *Beth* and *resh* may have nearly the same form in the usual cursive script.

The supposed error would thus be one of a very common order, and no other word could satisfy the requirement of the context so perfectly as the

one conjectured. The elders (*πρεσβύτεροι*) of the Jews had already taken their stand, along with the other authorities (4⁵ 23, Mt 27¹, etc.). It was not strange that 'no one' of them should be prepared, at present, to take the dangerous step of openly joining the rebellious sect. But 'all the more' (*μᾶλλον δέ*), the common people, were ready.

CHARLES C. TORREY.

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Εφθεσίαν ιν. 29.

THE traditional rendering of the phrase *πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν τῆς χρείας* seems awkward and unsatisfactory. May we not find a suggestion as to Paul's meaning from the use of *χρεία* in the later rhetoricians and in collections of bon-mots and stories about celebrities like Athenæus' *Deipnosophistæ*, as 'pointed saying' or 'good story'? Theon defines a *χρεία* as a 'concise saying or story aptly applied to a person or relating to a person.' Might we not render the verse: 'Let no unclean speech issue from your lips, but such witty talk as is useful for edification'? This suggestion involves taking *τῆς χρείας* with *λόγος*, and *ἀγαθός* with *πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν*. *Χρεῖαι* in pagan circles were decidedly not *πρὸς οἰκοδομὴν*. 'Ἰνα δὲ χάριν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν then means 'that a pleasant impression may be left on those who listen to it. One may wonder how *χρεία* came to have this meaning (was it because it was needed to make conversation?), but there is no doubt that it was current in this sense at the beginning of the Christian era.

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Entre Nous.

Human Nature in the Bible and in Modern Psychology.

Professor Otto Piper, formerly Professor of Systematic Theology in Munster and in Göttingen, and now an exile from Germany, was in Aberdeen in the last week-end in April, and, besides preaching in the University Chapel, delivered the Murtle Lecture, as well as a lecture to the New Testament Society, and an address in Marischal College on the present religious position in Germany, all in fluent English.

Professor Piper's Murtle Lecture was entitled *Human Nature in the Bible and in Modern Psychology*. Christian people, he said, have watched the developments of modern psychologists with uneasiness, for they left objective truth out of their reckoning. Even from a purely psychological point of view this was unsatisfactory. Man is more than a compound of fantasies all aiming at individual satisfactions. The individual who moves simply towards the fulfilment of his own wishes is not even normal. To be merely in harmony with your-

self is not normal. The Christian point of view is that it is not necessary to attain success in life before you can live a moral life. But Behaviourism teaches the art of dominating others through the reckless use of one's own capacities. And psychoanalysis has too often failed to bring about any real healing because it cannot overcome the patient's self-concern. He is so eagerly concerned with himself that he becomes more and more sensitive to all obstacles in the way of his own success. And the person trained by Behaviourism is busy all the time adjusting himself to changing environments and does not know what he is living for. His outlook becomes narrower and narrower, and his social efficiency correspondingly diminishes.

But when we turn to the Bible we are confronted with the objective truth of God. God's truth is not only an idea to be known but a state of things to be lived in.

Dr. Piper then considered five points or aspects of the nature of man as it is revealed in the Bible: (1) Man in the Bible is man in his totality, body, mind, and spirit. Idealism tends to volatilize man into nothing but spirit, materialism to confine him to the body, but the Christian outlook sees the different functions of body, mind, and spirit all giving expression to one identical ego.

(2) The Bible tells us that man is a creature among other creatures, but also lord of the world. This explains the fact that in his human nature man shows such similarity with the animal creation and yet is superior to it. Yet his superiority is not based so much on his reason as on the fact that God has determined him to be the lord of Nature.

(3) According to the Bible the individual has a natural relation to all men through love and service. Individualism makes man selfish, naturalism makes him merely one of a herd or mass.

(4) The Bible shows human life depending in the last resort on moral law. And (5) man's destiny is to be a child of God, holy and perfect like God. But the Christian's life is not yet life in the truth, it is only an approach to it. It would be easier to show what true life is if we could describe the life of Christ from the point of view of the modern psychologist. But there is not sufficient ground for that in the New Testament. Therefore it is more satisfactory to start from empiric life and show how it expresses its characteristics in such a way that the psychologists feel bound to acquiesce. One cannot then deny that the natural man has in his heart unrest, dissatisfaction, unhappiness, which cannot be accounted for by environment, but is a part of himself. Con-

fronting this situation, the normal man knows that the basis of his life ought to be the truth, but the pathological case does not believe that he himself is responsible for this lack of harmony, and seeks to find the blame elsewhere. On the other hand, the normal man recognizes that his natural life must be regarded as a lie: he sees the continual lying of life—to ourselves and to our fellow-men. We try to convince ourselves and our fellow-men that we are true till God's revealed truth wakes us. Our first reaction is categorically to reject the gospel, for no one can accept God's grace who does not repent of the lie in his heart. Yet the fight against the gospel is to-day half-hearted and full of shame. It takes refuge in mass persecutions against Christians, as in Russia, for the leaders are too timid for personal argument. And men are not allowed to plead their innocence or to spread the gospel. In this, against their own will, they bear witness to the power of God. And further, in order to prevent people discovering the lie upon which they base their existence, all political religions of modern times have to have in themselves certain resemblances to Christianity.

Where, then, are we to find the most significant indication of man's kinship with objective truth? Clearliest of all we find it in conscience, in self-sacrifice, in the love and appreciation of beauty, and in man's dissatisfaction with life as it is. And face to face with this objective truth, the theologian and the psychologist must accept the same dictum, 'Without me ye can do nothing.'

EDITH ANNE ROBERTSON.

Aberdeen.

The Beechers.

As we enjoy the breadth of the picture and the variety of incident in Lyman Beecher Stowe's *Saints, Sinners, and Beechers*, recently published by Messrs. Ivor Nicholson & Watson (12s. 6d. net), the question suggests itself why there are so many biographies of individuals and so few biographies of the family. We are all set down in families, and the family biography brings us so much closer to actual life.

The answer is that while it is not easy to find the outstanding individual it is still more difficult to find the family, all the members of which tower above their peers. We cannot call to mind one that offers to the biographer such a stirring subject as the Beechers—of whom Dr. Leonard Bacon said, 'this country is inhabited by saints, sinners, and Beechers. There never was a Beecher who was pious or conventional enough to qualify as a saint,

and yet they could hardly be confused with sinners, since they were always pursuing them with a sharp stick.'

Lyman Beecher Stowe—writing of Catharine Beecher—says she 'had now developed to the full that passion for not minding her own business which characterised the Beecher family. Of course, whether you mind your own business or not depends on your definition of what your business is. The Beechers regarded as their business anything which advanced the welfare of mankind.'

Lyman Beecher, the father of the family, fought for every cause that advanced human freedom. When a committee of ministers, who had been appointed to look into the matter of intemperance, reported 'they were obliged to confess they did not perceive that anything could be done,' Lyman Beecher, describing his own action, said, 'the blood started through my heart when I heard this. I rose instanter and moved . . . ' He had so much influence over his family that all his seven sons followed him into the ministry and all his family fought for the causes he loved. His eldest daughter, Catharine, was a pioneer in education, but no single cause ever exhausted the energy of a Beecher, and in 1829, for example, she was immersed in a campaign for the defence of the Cherokee Indians whom the State of Georgia was trying to drive out from their territory.

In writing *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Harriet Beecher Stowe was following her father in the anti-slavery cause. She brought into her writing a knowledge of the slave trade, and also the simple faith of her childhood's conversion, and a sorrow which she felt impelled to turn to the good of others. 'In those depths of sorrow which seem to be immeasurable (the death at Cincinnati of her baby, Samuel Charles) it was my only prayer to God that such anguish might not be suffered in vain. I felt that I could never be consoled for it unless this crushing of my own heart might help me to work out some great good to others.'

Isabella Beecher, like the other members of the family, believed that anything was her business, from re-arranging her daughter-in-law's furniture to changing the legal and civic status of women—anything which gave her the chance of helping an individual, a group of individuals, or humanity at large. She had the family's sensitiveness to suffering. 'A few months before she died in 1907 she said to her granddaughter, Isabel, "I can't stand all the suffering in the world!" "Well, grandmother, you have the satisfaction of knowing you have always done more than your share to

relieve it." "That's the point. As long as I could help, I could stand it, but now that I can no longer help, I can't stand it!"'

While on a suffrage speaking tour in the Middle-West in 1870, and supposed, in the popular belief of the day, to have lost interest in her home with all her suffragist activities, she sent this delightful letter to her son Edward:

'Tell little Mary to sit right down and tell me what they are doing and saying while I am away, and how much she limps now and whether the chestnuts are falling thick and fast and how many apples we are going to have . . . and whether Ned, the horse, limps any, and Ned, the boy, teases her any, and how many games of euchre she plays with Dick [Dr. Richard Burton, poet and lecturer] . . . and whether Aunt Sarah feels better . . . and whether she keeps the table well set . . . and whether there are any more big snakes around . . . and whether the pond has been gravelled and has water in it and a fountain playing . . . and how the meat man behaves, now Sarah has gone, and whether his bill is a good deal less, now I am away with my enormous appetite . . . and how her mother likes the new clothes-line that Willie [William Gillette, the actor] has put up. . . . All this and much more I shall hope to hear about when I get to Des Moines. . . . I do wish Willie would write me. I like his letters so much. Suppose you write a joint letter and make some fun for me . . . no one understands that better than he does. . . .'

Henry Ward Beecher, the fourth and greatest son of Lyman Beecher, said of himself, 'I do not know what it is in me, whether it is my father or my mother or both of them—but the moment you tell me that a thing that should be done is unpopular, I am right there every time.' He became famous as an editor, lecturer, and great anti-slavery leader, but it was as a preacher that he wanted to be remembered. His revival labours brought thousands to conversion, and for thirty-seven years he filled Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, and it would hold three thousand people. I am not a fisher of ideas, of books, or of sermons, but a fisher of men, he said of himself, and, writing to his friend, Rossiter W. Raymond, he said, 'when I am gone do not let it be forgotten that my one aim was the winning of the souls of men.'

Freewill.

'While still in Litchfield [Lyman] Beecher arranged to exchange pulpits on a certain Sunday with a minister in a neighbouring town—an Old-School Calvinist. They met half-way between their

respective towns, and when they stopped to greet each other the Old-School man exclaimed, "Doctor Beecher, I wish to call to your attention that before the creation of the world God arranged that you were to preach in my pulpit and I in yours on this particular Sabbath." "Is that so? Then I won't do it!" retorted Beecher. And he wheeled his chaise about and drove back to his own church, leaving his fellow-minister staring blankly after him.¹

The Black Christ.

At Christmas-time in 1932, John White, the veteran missionary from Mashonaland, was lying ill at Kingsmead Close, near Selly Oak. It was there that C. F. Andrews first met him, and within a short time of his death they became such close friends that he has written the story of his life—*John White of Mashonaland* (Hodder & Stoughton; 5s. net). He tells us that from the beginning they began quite naturally to call each other by their Christian names, and so throughout the biography he speaks of White of Mashonaland as 'John.' It is a small criticism perhaps, but we would have liked it better if he had used the simple Quaker form 'John White' rather than the familiar first name.

In the great passion of their lives—to interpret the black race to the white and the white to the black, and to see that the black man received justice—John White and C. F. Andrews were at one. The book abounds with instances of the deplorable position of the Africans, especially in Southern Rhodesia.

'There was a case, for instance, in which a native was found trespassing on a white man's property. He was arrested by the owner, fastened to a tree and flogged. He died from his injuries. The European was tried, and let off with a short period of imprisonment.

One other occasion is the instance of a European killing a native; though the accused himself pleaded guilty, the jury brought in a verdict of not guilty. So surprised was the judge that on giving his decision he turned to the jury and said: "Gentlemen, I would advise you to go home and read carefully the Ten Commandments."

The Missionary Conference of Southern Rhodesia owed its existence to John White and he was vitally interested in it, but he allowed himself to be cut adrift from it for the sake of his people. He felt very keenly the lack of justice that was meted out to the African, and especially the way in which admissions were obtained from them and then used against them. He spoke about this at the Confer-

ence; the Colonial Secretary became hostile to him, and his name was finally omitted from the Executive. Through all the struggle he was supported by his great friend and fellow-missionary Arthur Cripps, who put into verse what John White expressed in prose. C. F. Andrews gives two verses from the *Black Christ*. We quote them, for nothing could show better what John White's life stood for:

To me, as one born out of his due time,
To me, as one not much to reckon in,
He hath revealed Himself, not as to Paul,
Christ, throned and crowned,
But marred, despised, rejected,
The Divine Outcast of a terrible land,
The Black Christ, with parched lips and empty hand.

No orb hath He, nor ring,
No crown, nor throne.

Like worm, and like no man,
They use Him.

God forgive me, should I fail
This Christ, thus robed, in bronze or black, to hail!

Universal Christian Council on Life and Work.

The Second International Theological Seminar will be held in Geneva from July 22nd to August 11th. The programme will consist of courses on present-day theological currents in the various Churches of Europe and America, a comparative study of eschatological theology, different aspects of the Ecumenical movements, the Problem of Church and State (this has been proposed as the central subject for the coming World Conference on Life and Work), the relationship between Orthodox and Western Churches, and problems of social ethics.

The lectures will be given by Professor Karl Barth, Professor Dibelius, Professor Frick, Dr. Bouquet, Professor William Adams Brown, Professor Richardson, etc.

A full programme can be obtained from the Director of the Seminar, Professor Adolf Keller, 2 Montchoisy, Geneva.

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¹ L. B. Stowe, *Saints, Sinners, and Beechers*, 52.